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T R O T T E R  R E V I E W 
 
“Separatist City”: The Mandela, 
Massachusetts (Roxbury) Movement and the 
Politics of Incorporation, Self-Determination, 
and Community Control, 1986–1988 
 
Zebulon V. Miletsky and Tomás González 1 
 
 
"We didn't create this area, we just described it. The city of Boston is so incredibly 




“Being part of Boston used to be OK, 
When the city used to allocate money our way. 
Now all that's changed and it's plain to see, 
That the city only cares about property . . . 
Let Boston see what it's got to see, 
Mandela, Massachusetts, is the place to be.” 
 
—“Mandela,” Massachusetts rap song; lyrics by Andrew Jones 3 
 
 
                                                        
1 The authors wish to acknowledge the valuable research assistance of Jeremy Bingham, an undergraduate student at 
Northeastern University studying space and place and their role in the contestation of society and culture under Tim Cresswell, 
professor of history and international affairs.  
2 (Kennedy, 1990: 124) 





 November 4, 2016, marks 30 years since the historic referendum in which 
close to 50,000 citizens of Boston living in or near the predominantly Black area of 
“Greater Roxbury” voted on whether the area should leave Boston and incorporate 
as a separate municipality to be named in honor of former South African president 
Nelson and Winnie Mandela, or remain a part of Boston. The new community, 
what planners called “Greater Roxbury,” would have included wards in much or all 
of the neighborhoods of Roxbury, Dorchester, Mattapan, Jamaica Plain, the 
Fenway, the South End, and what was then known as Columbia Point. Although it 
was defeated by a 3-to-1 margin in 1986, the measure was raised again in 1988, 
with a different organizing strategy that spoke to the more turbulent climate of the 
late 1980s. This campaign included an expanded focus on issues of gang violence, 
drug abuse, and other forms of lawlessness that plagued the Black community. 
This attempt, too, went down in defeat. Conceived a mere 12 years after court-
ordered school desegregation in Boston, Mandela symbolized in many ways 
attempts to address equity issues that were never completely resolved after the 
school desegregation crisis of the 1970s.  
 As Pierre Clavel writes in Activists in City Hall: The Progressive Response 
to the Reagan Era in Boston and Chicago, “They asked Flynn to hold a plebiscite 
in Roxbury on the question, and when he refused, gathered the five thousand 
signatures necessary to put the question on the ballot as a nonbinding referendum. 
Their success in getting the signatures in August, three months before the 
November election, apparently took both the city administration and the black 
leadership by surprise.” (Clavel, 2010, 81)  
 As Marie Kennedy and Chris Tilly write in a critical piece on Mandela that 
appeared in Radical America, “The separation proposal—technically a non-binding 
proposal to ‘de-annex and reincorporate’ Roxbury, which was until 1868 an 
independent town—whipped up a storm of controversy. Boston city officials 
 3 
damned it as ‘economically preposterous and at worst, a program of racial 
separation.’ The Greater Roxbury Incorporation Project (GRIP), sponsors of the 
Mandela initiative, maintained, ‘We want land control because land control is the 
key to self-determination.’” As Kennedy and Tilly argue, “The proposal rekindled 
a debate that has simmered in US black communities for over a hundred years. Can 
the black community (or any other community of color) better achieve well being 
by assimilation into the white society, or by establishing community control over 
development?”(Kennedy and Tilly, 1987, 23) 
 Andrew Jones stated about Mandela, “We feel that we have a ‘colonial 
relationship’ with the city of Boston; we feel that the city of Boston has treated us 
like second-class citizens and we’re fighting for basic rights of citizenship.” 
(WGBH, 1986) Much of the ideological impetus behind Mandela came from the 
dialogues of the 1960s and the Black Power era which advocated for self-
determination and community control.  As Kennedy, Gastón, and Tilly write, “In 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, militant Black leaders—including Malcolm X, Roy 
Innis, and Stokely Carmichael—compared the Black liberation struggle in the 
United States with anticolonial struggles around the world. A number of radical 
economists developed the analogy.” They continue: “If community control can 
help poor Blacks empower themselves and alter some of the 'colonial' economic 
mechanisms that marginalize them, then in the long run the community control 
strategy may offer a great deal of promise for economic development.” (Kennedy 
et al., 1990)   
 As they point out, “William Tabb, writing in 1970, pointed out that 'the 
economic relations of the ghetto to white America closely parallel [the relations] 
between third world nations and the industrially advanced countries.' Tabb 
explained that like the typical developing country, the Black community has low 
income per capita; has a small middle class, limited entrepreneurship, and an 
internal market too underdeveloped to support much local business; faces a low 
price and limited demand for its chief 'export'—unskilled and semi-skilled labor; 
shows high internal demand for expensive 'imports'—consumer goods such as cars, 
televisions, designer clothes; and experiences low rates of savings, investment and 
productivity growth. Tabb concluded that 'internal colonialism is an apt description 
of the place Blacks have held and continue to hold in our country.' All of these 
characteristics describe Roxbury, whose per capita income in 1979 was less than 
two-thirds that of Boston as a whole.  (Kennedy et al., 1990)   
Very much in the tradition of Black Power–era groups such as the Republic 
of New Africa  (RNA), which was founded in 1968 as an American social 
movement based in the ideology of Black Nationalism, it had as one if its main 
goals the creation of an independent African American–majority country situated 
in the southeastern United States.  The RNA attempted to lay claim to an 
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independent Black republic created out of the southern states of South Carolina, 
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, which were considered “subjugated 
lands.” The RNA proposed that these lands separate from the larger United States 
to function as “a government in exile” for Black Americans and the basis for a new 
Black nation. Much of the idea for this was based on Tanzania president Julius 
Nyerere’s “ujamaa” concept of self-government and cooperative economics. 
(Bracey, Meier, and Rudwick, 1970)  
 As Kennedy, Tilly, and Gastón further point out, “Tanzania's Julius Nyerere 
has made a number of observations that seem relevant to the struggle to develop 
Roxbury. ‘A country, or a village, or a community cannot be developed,' Nyerere 
argued. 'It can only develop itself. For real development means the development, 
the growth, of people.'” (Kennedy et al., 1990).  
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While scholars and journalists have documented the story of Mandela fairly 
well, many people in Boston have either never heard of it, vaguely remember it, or 
never understood it in the first place. Others would just as soon forget it and are 
happy to never bring it up again.  Since the Mandela campaign did happen, this 
article simply seeks to provide some context for the initiative, to tell the story, and 
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to organize the vast amount of media coverage on Mandela, despite its relative 
obscurity. With this upcoming inauspicious anniversary, it seems that things have 
come full circle in 30 years, and therefore it is an opportune time to revisit a 
relatively misunderstood chapter in the city’s history. 
This article examines the history of Mandela in Boston and the secession 
movement that arose in Roxbury in the mid-1980s and manifested in referenda to 
support the creation of a new separate Black-majority city. Also considered are the 
economic development implications that would have come with the separate city 
and how that issue figured into the political debate, resultant referenda, and their 
popularity, or lack thereof, even among many African Americans. Additionally, we 
note the concerns raised by prominent members of the African-American faith 
community. The main criticism of the Mandela idea was an essential question 
asked by many—how would they "go it alone" economically?  By examining the 
rhetoric of that debate, we explore the politics around the movement, taking into 
consideration the idea of “de-annexing” or incorporation that galvanized the 
community at a time when gang violence and the crack epidemic threatened to 
dismantle many of the gains of the 1960s and 1970s. The backdrop was very much 
Reagan’s America, where social services were being cut and hip-hop was the 
medium of expression in the streets. 
Ultimately, we hope to force a reconsideration of the spirit of Mandela—
community control, land control, and control over one’s destiny. While the media 
and the position often tried to paint Mandela as a separatist or secession issue, its 
advocates insisted it was very much rooted in “land control.” As former city 
councilor Chuck Turner notes, “The legacy of the Mandela movement was that the 
issue was to have the community having an authoritative voice in that, in that 
process…” (Turner interview with authors, 2016)  Without question the idea of 
Mandela fanned racial, political flames and awakened the civic imagination as it 
drew national media attention. Whether people agreed or not, it intrigued the 
nation.  Many observers were interested in the outcome, although almost all of the 
media attention was skeptical about the initiative’s ability to address the problems 
its founders claimed it was designed to ameliorate.  
Moving beyond discussions of the failures of the referenda or the lack of 
viability of the initial idea, it is crucial to focus on the fact that it was a radical idea 
that pushed the city and the administration of Mayor Ray Flynn to demonstrate its 
commitment to economic development in Roxbury and to the Black constituency 
that had overwhelmingly voted for Mel King, Flynn’s opponent in the 1983 
general election. By the mid-1980s, “land control” was the reigning civil rights 
issue for the Black community in Boston. At the height of the anti-apartheid 
movement among Black Americans nationally, “Mandela” symbolized the struggle 
for power in the 1980s, both metaphorically and actually. Additionally, we argue 
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that the historic step of extending eminent domain to the community-based 
organization Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI), long hailed as a model 
of community organizing and empowerment, would not have been possible 
without the Mandela initiative, which represented a more extreme alternative in the 
minds of Mayor Flynn and the populace at large. Finally, we suggest beneath the 
Mandela initiative lay groups like the Greater Roxbury Neighborhood Authority 
(GRNA) that were also engaging in campaigns to assert community-based control.    
Spearheaded by two outsiders to Boston, Andrew Jones and Curtis Davis, 
the idea split the community, with people on both sides supporting or actively 
working against it. "Separatist City" was the somewhat reactionary label that the 
media gave to this ambitious but ultimately failed attempt at Black self-
determination. Overall, that media attention was skeptical of the idea of Mandela, 
though there were exceptions. 
It is important to mention at the outset that the Mandela referendum, had it 
passed, would not have created a separate city outright.  It would merely have 
made the suggestion to the legislature that this was something a majority of the 
voters wanted, which the legislature could have then taken into consideration and 
could have acted upon.  
As Marie Kennedy and Chris Tilly write in “The Mandela Campaign: A 
Summary,” “The Boston white establishment reacted with a self-righteous anger 
born of wounded liberalism. Boston's leading daily newspaper, The Boston Globe, 
in a near-hysterical outpouring unprecedented since the 1970s racial violence 
associated with busing, published by our count at least twelve negative articles on 
Mandela in the three weeks preceding the election. The articles included two 
editorials and two signed columns, charging Mandela advocates with 
"deceitfulness," "negativism, untruths, and confusion," making "loud, angry 
charges," being "hostile and divisive," and "promot[ing] racial segregation." The 
Globe, along with other opponents of Mandela, persisted in calling the 
reincorporation proposal "secession," a term that GRIP rejected. The Phoenix, 
Boston's leading alternative weekly, joined the Globe in deploring Mandela.” 
(Kennedy and Tilly, 23) 
James Jennings, professor emeritus of urban and environmental policy and 
planning at Tufts University, recalls: “There was intense debate which I always felt 
was healthy because again intense debate, if it’s within the framework of economic 
democracy and social justice, then, you know, the synthesis of that only moves 
society forward, in my opinion.  So there was a lot of intense debate.  But again, 
functional, because we have had that debate before.  And now we can have a 




Review of the Mandela Coverage and Literature 
   
There is more scholarship on the Mandela movement than one might think.  
These works seem to generally fall into two categories: work tied to the 
community and work done outside of the community. While the former was 
carried out by scholars who had ties to the community and, in some cases, were 
tangentially involved, the latter was produced by professional scholars of various 
disciplines with few connections to community institutions and without much input 
from the primary actors about whom they were writing.   
Besides these two broad and rather simplistic categories of scholarship on 
Mandela, it’s also important to consider the work on urban studies and community 
development in Boston more broadly and identify useful models in organizing the 
literature to better situate the story of Mandela. King, in his seminal book Chain of 
Change, cites three stages of political development in the Black community’s quest 
for liberation. Although his formulation related to politics, it is possible to extend it 
to the larger scholarship on African Americans in Boston. As such, it may be 
useful as a way to roughly organize the work on African Americans in Boston 
beyond the simplistic binary notion of work that emanates from outside Boston’s 
Black community versus that which is more organic or “home grown.” This 
theoretical framework can be helpful here in not only better understanding the 
Mandela movement, but in attempting to categorize the various “stages” or broad 
“categories” of scholarly work on African Americans in Boston along these same 
lines.  
 For scholarship produced by those without ties to the community, one could 
best describe it in a way as being akin to what King characterized as the “service 
stage” of the Black liberation struggle in Boston. He writes, “The Service Stage 
was a time during which the community of color was dependent on the ‘good will’ 
of the white society for access to its goods, its services, its jobs, housing and 
schools. Black people were expected to trust that the system would work for 
them—eventually.” (King, 1981, 6)   
Following this line of thought logically, other work on Mandela could also 
be said to fall into the “service stage”—as well as the following two stages—the 
“organization stage” and, finally, the “institution building” stage.  King writes, 
“The Organizing Stage encompasses most of the 1960’s. The moment Black 
People began to awaken to their own potential to state, ‘We are deserving,’ the 
process of organizing ourselves began. No longer were we content to wait. We 
demanded our rights.” (King, 1981, 27)  Under this rubric might fall much of the 
critical knowledge building that was acquired by the Black press, which kicked 
open doors in the 1960s to access the print and broadcast newsrooms of Boston 
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and create an army of Black reporters intent on being able to “shape the story” of 
the Black experience in the city.  
One thinks of a Sarah-Ann Shaw, first female African American television 
reporter in Boston, who grew up in an “organizing family.” Her mother worked 
alongside the selfless Melnea Cass, and Shaw's father, who was active in the 
Roxbury Democratic Club, took her to lectures as a child. In high school, she 
became involved with the NAACP Youth Movement. Increasingly involved in 
community activities, Shaw worked with St. Mark's Social Center and as a member 
of the Boston Action Group (BAG), one of Boston’s most important and effective 
civil rights groups. In 1968, she became involved with Ray Richardson's “Say 
Brother” public affairs show on WGBH-TV and, in 1969, was hired by WBZ-TV  
as a reporter. 
 An initial article from the now defunct Roxbury Community News, edited by 
Mary Ann Crayton, is what actually motivated the Globe to write about the 
Mandela referenda in a more nuanced way. Jennings recalls that “the Roxbury 
Community News had two or three important pieces on what was happening on the 
ground, and I think that’s what motivated the Globe to say, ‘Hey, wait a second.  
We have to write about this as well, other than calling people separatist.’” 
(Jennings, interview with authors, 2016) 
 The long-standing Black newspaper, the Bay State Banner, deserves special 
mention for its extensive coverage of Mandela.  Melvin B. Miller, editor of the 
Banner, historically known to fall more on the conservative side of such issues, 
arranged for a balanced interpretation—one that could even be characterized as 
positive.  Much of the coverage’s quality stems from the devoted reporting of 
Banner scribe Brian Wright O’Connor, who kept the record on Mandela.  
 There were many others who provided solid and consistent coverage of the 
Mandela story, including  Callie Crossley, Carmen Fields, and Marcus Jones, all 
formerly of the 10 O’Clock News, WGBH; Beth Deare and Robin Washington of 
“Say Brother,” WGBH; and Luix Overbea of The Christian Science Monitor all 
provided coverage. 
King describes the last stage in Boston’s political development as the 
“Institution Building” stage.  He explains, “The confidence and experience gained 
through the organizing process prompted us to begin thinking differently about 
what we wanted to gain.  Just as a person grows up and realizes that no one else 
can provide what you want as well as you can, because you really are the only 
person who can know what you want, Black people began to realize that just 
getting access to the existing institutions was not the best way to meet our needs.” 
(King, 1981, 151)  In this “institution building” stage, Boston has developed what 
could be called an “indigenous” scholarship infrastructure, growing its own 
scholars in the tradition of Black and Ethnic Studies, where many scholars 
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(including scholars of color and/or allies) have either come out of the civil rights 
and Black Power movements of the 1960s or are members of the post–civil rights 
generation.  Their work could most adequately be called the fruit of the “institution 
building” stage. 
Much of the scholarship on Mandela falls into the “institution building” 
stage—work that was nurtured from within a community framework, utilized 
community sources, and reflected a concern about community roots.  Studies 
falling under this heading were produced by entities like the Trotter Institute at the 
University of Massachusetts Boston—by authors with ties to its College of Public 
and Community Service. The strongest work by far written on Mandela came out 
of that intellectual community through the scholarship of Jennings, Marie 
Kennedy, the late Mauricio Gastón, and Chris Tilly.  In contrast, like much of the 
mainstream coverage, which was acerbically negative, the secondary literature on 
Mandela from outside the community largely mirrored the skepticism expressed in 
the mainstream media.  
Authors whose larger work had a wider focus and who may have devoted a 
page or two to Mandela often characterize it as an idea that was more symbolic in 
nature and essentially as a failure. A notable exception is the doctoral dissertation 
“The Sociology of a City in Transition: Boston 1980–2000” by Donald A. Gillis, a 
sociologist who spent most of his career working for the city of Boston in the 
mayoral administrations of Ray Flynn.  While Mandela was not his main focus, the 
study does offer an analysis of how race influenced Boston.  
 “Indigenous” scholarship that falls under both the “insider” column and 
aspires to that higher, nobler status of “institution building” would certainly 
include the work of King and Jennings. Their work, in both The Politics of Black 
Empowerment: The Transformation of Black Activism in Urban America (1992) 
and From Access to Power: Black Politics in Boston (1986), devotes a great deal of 
attention to Mandela, and more important to the urban conditions that gave rise to a 
call for incorporation. In fact, this partnership and ongoing collaboration has 
produced the highest order of scholarly studies on Boston’s Black community. 
Scholarship on Roxbury and the Black community in Boston during the critical 
movement years of the 1960s to the present owe a great deal to these foundational 
texts. The work of King and Jennings provides the penultimate examples of the 
“insider” work that also falls in the category of “institution building” as it applies 
to the scholarship on Boston’s Black liberation movement.  The many works of 
Robert C. Hayden, longtime historian of Black Boston, must also be noted. Hayden 
“is a historian, author, and educator, who has contributed to African American 
historiography for thirty-five years. He is the author, co-author, and editor of 
nineteen books and special publications in the field… From 1974 to 1983, he wrote 
a weekly column, “Boston’s Black History,” for the Bay State Banner newspaper 
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in Boston.” (Historymakers.com) His steadfast column resulted in a book that is 
still the standard for Black history in Boston, African Americans in Boston: More 
Than 350 Years. Other texts by “allies” include James Green’s Taking History to 
Heart: The Power of the Past in Building Social Movements and the critical 
volume edited by Mike Davis, Steven Hiatt, Marie Kennedy, Susan Ruddick, and 
Michael Sprinker, Fire in the Hearth: The Radical Politics of Place in America.4 
 Radical America, a left-wing political magazine established in 1967 and 
published out of Somerville, Massachusetts, brought together the leading voices on 
the questions raised here regarding Boston and Roxbury for a special issue on 
“Race & Community Control, Media, Politics” in the fall of 1986.  All combined, 
these essays played an important role in deconstructing how race was understood 
in Boston in the mid-1980s.  Paul Buhle and Mari Jo Buhle, who were activists in 
Students for a Democratic Society, founded the magazine. An article, “The 
Mandela Campaign: An Overview,” by Marie Kennedy and Chris Tilly, was an 
abridged version of a longer article that appeared as “A City Called Mandela: 
Secession and the Struggle for Community Control in Boston,” published in the 
spring 1987 issue of The North Star. Another article, coming from a more 
independent point of view, “Africa in Boston: A Critical Analysis of Mandela, 
Massachusetts,” written by Monty Neill, appeared in The New Enclosures in 1990.  
A book chapter by Nancy Haggard-Gilson, published in 1995 and titled “Boston's 
Mandela Referendum: Urban Nationalism and Economic Dependence,” was 
included in The Changing Racial Regime, edited by J. Matthew Holden, a 
publication of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists. 
Much like the authors in the special volume in Radical America, who called 
for a “rethinking” of the Mandela project, we are not seeking to rehash every 
aspect of the story, but rather to revisit this pivotal moment in the Black 
community’s relationship with the city of Boston, recounting what took place, and 
evaluating where things stand 30 years later.  Unlike much of that work, our 
project employs a slightly different disciplinary lens—considering these events 
from a historical perspective rather than an urban studies or social science one that 
have characterized virtually all of the work on Mandela until now. As such, this 
project uses oral histories as a key part of our analysis.  
 
 
                                                        
4 In terms of painting the foreground, other helpful works include: Lawrence Kennedy’s Planning the City Upon a 
Hill: Boston since 1930 (1992); Alan Lupo’s Liberty's Chosen Home: The Politics of Violence in Boston (1977); as 
well as Jim Vrabel’s A People’s History of the New Boston; and Thomas H. O’Conner’s Building a New Boston; 





The Context of the Mandela Idea 
 
To fully examine the contemporary implications for Boston’s community of 
color and what the idea of a new, separate majority-Black city would have meant 
to Roxbury, Jamaica Plain, the Fenway, the South End, and parts of Dorchester and 
Mattapan, it is important to note that Mandela was conceived by two relative 
beginners to organizing whose idea created a lasting rift in the Black community, 
with some Black elected officials supporting the referendum, while an active, 
organized, and well-funded campaign worked to defeat it.  
Although it may be easy to dismiss Andrew Jones and Curtis Davis as 
outsiders, Jennings makes an important point, “I had major concerns with people 
who would say, ‘Well, this is being pushed by outsiders.’ At the same time, the 
same individuals did not see a contradiction between that and fighting this 
apartheid in South Africa because the apartheid regime was saying the same thing.  
Ronald Reagan, our president at the time, was saying the same thing.” (Jennings, 
interview with authors, 2016) 
One aspect that distinguishes our research from previous undertakings is that 
we attempted to bring in “both sides” to this debate—not only the community, but 
also elected officials and mayoral appointees. As such, we interviewed former 
mayor Ray Flynn, his former chief of staff Neil Sullivan, and George Russell, who 
served as the city’s treasurer at the time and utilized some of the materials 
produced by the city—in an effort to give a more balanced interpretation of what 
took place 30 years ago, hopefully allowing “cooler heads to prevail” after such a 
divisive and turbulent moment in Boston’s history. 
  As mentioned previously, the idea of Mandela appeared only some 12 
years after the court desegregation decision that prompted Boston’s busing crisis, 
and despite Mayor Flynn’s best intentions and campaign promises, race relations 
were at an all-time low. Sadly, they would only sink lower after Mandela when the 
Charles Stuart murder case rocked Boston’s neighborhoods of color and was 
handled poorly by the administration. At the same time, as historian Jeanne 
Theoharis points out, “Flynn wanted to keep race out of the election, insisting that 
racism was not an issue, but distributed different flyers in black and white areas.” 
(Theoharis, 1996) The mayoral candidate famously styled himself a populist on the 
campaign trail.  Yet as Jennings reminds us, “The problem with a populist is that 
they overlook race in U.S. society.  And so remember, George Wallace was a 
populist.” (Jennings, interview with authors, 2016)  
In our research about Mandela, however, we discovered that Flynn and his 
position during this time perhaps deserve a second glance. Certainly naïve in his 
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optimism that race relations could be improved so quickly after a bitter and racially 
charged mayoral primary, Flynn himself seemed to have the best of intentions.  He 
integrated public housing in South Boston, an action that led to a direct 
confrontation with his own constituency.  In our interview with Flynn he 
reminisced about having played basketball throughout the city of Boston, and 
through that process having built a sense of camaraderie with some of his 
teammates, many of who happened to be Black. He even boasted of having once 
played on a semiprofessional basketball team, where his teammate was none other 
than a young Mel King.  (Raymond Flynn interview with Tomás González, 2016) 
As Clavel writes, “Flynn was from an Irish family in South Boston. He was a 
basketball star at Providence College, and later, when he returned to Boston, he 
was elected to the state legislature and city council… He would reminisce about 
coming back from college and a tryout with the Boston Celtics, and playing ball in 
neighborhoods like the West End that were being decimated by urban renewal. He 
got to know Mel King that way. In 1971 he found himself elected to the legislature 
from South Boston and served there with King. Then, in 1978, he was on city 
council through the mayoral race in 1983.” (Clavel, 2010: 55) 
Rather than the aforementioned memories, what most will remember are 
images of the first mayor elected from the neighborhood of South Boston riding 
the fire engines to emergencies around the city—many of those fires occurring in 
Roxbury—that were part of the larger legacy of arson that created so many of the 
vacant buildings that eventually became empty lots.  
 According to Medoff and Sklar, authors of Streets of Hope, “In 1981, 
Roxbury's Highland Park neighborhood was dubbed ‘The Arson Capital of the 
Nation.’" Most of the fires, the Arson Commission noted, "were directly related to 
increased speculation due to the Southwest Corridor Project," the massive 
redevelopment project centered around the relocated mass transit Orange Line 
(which used to run through Dudley Station) and extending from the South End 
through Roxbury and Jamaica Plain. The Arson Commission stated: "Many of the 
buildings that were burned were among the approximately 75 abandoned buildings 
that local residents attempted to save for low-income housing and community-
based activities. When frightened residents, ignored then by Mayor [Kevin] White, 
appealed" to the state for assistance, they "learned that Highland Park's fire 
statistics were the highest in the Commonwealth.’"  (Medoff and Sklar, 1994, 31)  
 In a documentary made about the founding of the Dudley Street 
Neighborhood Initiative, “Holding Ground,” Byron Rushing recalled, “More and 
more houses were being abandoned. And then a number of the owners of those 
buildings decided that one of the ways that they could get their money back, and 
maybe even make a quick profit, was to burn their houses down.” (Lipman and 
Mahan, 1996) Che Madyun, a neighborhood resident who became a primary 
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organizer in the Dudley Street effort, recalled: “You go to sleep at night and you 
hear the sirens and you go, oh gosh here we go again, another building is gonna 
burn down. You get up, you run to the window, you look. Sometimes you see it, 
sometimes you smell it.” (Lipman and Mahan, 1996)  The Rev. Paul Bothwell, a 
resident and would-be organizer, also recollected, “I can remember kids being 
dragged out already dead, kids being dragged out in flames, the father in flames, 
running out of the house screaming and the neighborhood just stunned. And it 
happened again and again and again.”  (Lipman and Mahan, 1996)  Again Madyun 
offered, “Every night there was a fire. It was like this block and the next block and 
the block after that. And each time they'd burn a house, they'd tear it down and you 
had another vacant lot. So I saw the vacant lots increase. The amount of crap on 
the vacant lots increased and it just kept getting worse and worse and worse.”  
(Lipman and Mahan, 1996)   
 
Gentrification and the Reemergence of Black Political Agency 
 
In January 1986, Bruce Bolling Sr. was elected as the first Black president of 
the Boston City Council in its 170-year history. Only three years before, King had 
achieved the feat of being the first African-American candidate to make it into the 
mayoral general election, putting up very respectable numbers in the quest for 
power.  In many ways, these two men embodied the two poles in the vast 
ideological political spectrum of Boston’s Black community in the 1980s. King 
was an organizer, while Bolling represented the existing political establishment; 
one was from Roxbury and reflected a grassroots perspective, while the other was 
from the South End. While these two men representing different constituencies 
seemed dissimilar, in fact there was much that they shared: both were self-made 
men who ran for the office of mayor, and both were leaders of the Black 
community.  There was, however, one key area in which they differed: King 
supported Mandela; Bolling did not.  
As Kennedy and Tilly write, “State Senator Royal Bolling, Sr., patriarch of 
Boston's mainstream black political dynasty, supported the effort to put the 
question on the ballot, but opposed the content of the proposal, saying, ‘We have 
the swing vote to determine any election. So why give up the whole pie for just a 
slice?’” Although Bolling's son Bruce Sr., then City Council President, initially 
backed the referendum, he was slowly dragged into the opposition. (Kennedy and 
Tilly, 1987, 24)  
In the wake of the election of Bolling Sr. and King’s strong showing in the 
1983 mayoral race, grassroots activists and community organizers in Roxbury were 
fighting for economic redress.  Black activists were tired of living in decaying and 
crime-ridden neighborhoods while downtown Boston prospered. Black residents 
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feared the rumored gentrification, which had already claimed the South End and 
parts of Roxbury, both close to downtown. Beneath the commercial heart of 
Roxbury, there were concerns that it was going to become the next South End, 
which had in the earlier part of the twentieth century been the home to the majority 
of Black, Puerto Rican, and West Indian residents. By the early 1980s, the South 
End had become largely White and well off. The population shift was notable 
given that members of this community provided King his base of support in 1968, 
when he, along with a multitude of other demonstrators under the banner of the 
Community Assembly for a United South End (CAUSE), occupied a parking lot at 
130 Dartmouth Street to protest the displacement of residents by urban renewal.  
This group of concerned citizens pitched tents and occupied the site for a number 
of days. This protest led to the Tent City housing development, a mixed-income 
high-rise that opened its doors on April 30 1988. (Vrabel, 2014, 123) 
 Tent City still stands defiantly amid multimillion-dollar buildings and the 
luxuriousness of Copley Square. Although King held a strong front that would alter 
the development to include affordable units, he could not save the entire the South 
End. Amid the area’s increased investment and profitability, some Black families 
managed to hold on to their properties, but sadly many others made the decision to 
capitalize on rising home values and sold theirs. On the one hand, this led to 
increased Black wealth through the ownership of market-priced homes, but the 
results were nothing short of transformative. Latinos also struggled to hold on to 
their portion of the South End, which resulted in the development of the Villa 
Victoria apartment complex on Parcel 19—known more popularly as “La 
Parcela”—the continued existence of which is a testament to their ongoing struggle 
for community control. (Matos-Rodriguez, 2006)  
In these early stages of gentrification, small, unified efforts could not 
prevent the inevitable. Investment in Black communities became infectious, shortly 
taking hold of the historic Roxbury Highlands—known locally as Fort Hill. Cruz 
Construction would introduce the condominium real estate model to Eliot Square, 
a picturesque section of the historic Highland Park section of Roxbury. It was 
known that the city government planned to create additional municipal space to 
Dudley Square, having already built a library branch and police station. Thirty 
years later, the city purchased the long-vacant Ferdinand furniture building, 
restoring it to its prior greatness, with mixed commercial and municipal office 
space, including a café and bistro. In various ways, the renewal of the Ferdinand 
building represents the culmination of Mandela. For many, this signaled the 
potential resurgence of Dudley Square, the economic and transportation hub of 
Roxbury, as well as serving as a symbol. Recent public investment included the 
construction of a new police substation and the revitalization of the most glaring 
eyesore right in the heart of Dudley Square, the Ferdinand Building, which has 
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been renamed the Bruce Bolling Building. Boston’s newspapers routinely reported 
on the racial shift and disinvestment in the city’s urban core, with the residential 
transformation of these areas marking the slow but steady demographic 
transformation as a new group of more affluent and younger Whites replaced 
longtime Black residents.  At the same time, longtime White residents fled the city 
in droves to make the suburbs home.  The South End, with its charming 
brownstone-style row houses and carefully landscaped tree-lined streets, offered a 
unique kind of urban living that was very appealing to the newly arrived young 
urbanites and former suburban empty-nesters.  
While most of the South End's housing was constructed during the Victorian 
era, its history was not one of luxury. Whites began moving out of the area in the 
late 1800s.  In the early 1900s, the neighborhood became home to the city's Black 
community, and in later years, Latinos and Chinese moved to the area. Just a 
stone’s throw away from the railroad yards, which would later become Back Bay 
Station and Copley Square, the South End side of the tracks was constantly filled 
with ash and soot from the steam-powered trains, which brought passengers and 
cargo to and from New York and all points in between. Many of the men who 
worked in the railroad yards, Pullman porters, lived in the South End community, 
which was not only conveniently located to the yards, but also more affordable.  
There were always rooms for rent in the South End’s brownstones. Often owned 
by Blacks, these homes were sometimes rented out as rooming houses. As Andrew 
Buni and Alan Rogers point out, “Job discrimination, for example, systematically 
deprived black artisans of their trades. This meant that many men were forced to 
seek low-paying, unskilled jobs in the rail yards and station of the South End. 
(Buni, Rogers, and Whelan, 1984) 
 While some of the longtime homeowners may have stood to gain financially 
from community-wide reinvestment and the development in the South End, many 
residents of Roxbury were more skeptical about the prospects of development. 
Buni writes, “In the South End, for example, long-time residents were amazed 
when brownstone homes that their immigrant owners could not sell for $5,000 in 
1950 were being sold for more than 10 times that amount a decade later.” (Buni et 
al., 1984)   
The mood in Roxbury in the 1980s was one of defiance, especially after 
having witnessed the decimation of the Black community in the South End, where 
Black residents were displaced by Whites, and parts of Lower Roxbury, which fell 
victim to the rapidly expanding campus of Northeastern University.  Instead of 
relying on the promises of White elected officials, they turned their energy to the 
political process and supported Black candidates for local elections. In fits and 
starts, the proud Black political tradition in Boston was revived when John D. 
O’Bryant in 1978 became the first African American elected to the Boston School 
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Committee. Bruce Bolling Sr. and his family had brought a grace and dignity to 
Black politics that gave many a sense of pride.  Byron Rushing replaced King as 
the state representative from the South End. 
    
A City Called Mandela: The Actors 
 
In the early 1980s, largely through the acumen of two men, Andrew Jones 
and Curtis Davis, residents of Roxbury decided they needed to do something big, if 
Boston’s communities of color were to ever prosper. Jones and Davis decided that 
Boston’s communities of color had to secede from the city of Boston in order to 
become self-reliant and maintain community control. Jones, a 34-year-old classical 
violinist, independent TV producer, and sometime actor, and Davis, a Harvard-
trained architect, started an organization called GRIP (the Greater Roxbury 
Incorporation Project) and so began the tumultuous fight for Black self-sufficiency. 
Their proposal would have taken Roxbury and other neighborhoods and renamed 
the area Mandela. The proposed city would have carved out 25 percent of Boston’s 
geographical terrain.  Although the measure went down to a resounding defeat, the 
referendum amounted to a vote on the quality of City Hall's governance of 
Boston's Black community. 
So who were Jones and Davis, the two major drivers behind this idea that 
sparked political imaginations aflame in the 1980s and then seemingly 
disappeared? Jones was a multitalented individual who first came to New England 
as a child from Richmond to attend Phillips Exeter Academy, the college prep 
school in New Hampshire. After graduating from Exeter in 1970, the accomplished 
violinist studied at the New England Conservatory of Music and later earned a 
master's degree in journalism from Boston University in 1982. After working as an 
ABC television network producer, foreign correspondent, and field producer of 
sorts, he became a successful documentary filmmaker.  In 1995, he left Boston and 
settled in Johannesburg, South Africa. After a faltering marriage and troubled 
family life, Jones became better known in more recent times as a father’s rights 
advocate after being labeled a “deadbeat dad.”  “In 2003, after voluntarily 
returning from South Africa to argue his case, Jones had his passport seized and 
was led out of the Edward Brooke Courthouse in handcuffs and taken to the South 
Bay House of Correction. The 52-year-old filmmaker spent 60 days in lockup 
while his wife and family sold assets and emptied bank accounts to come up with 
over $30,000 to begin satisfying the $100,000 child support judgment against 
him.” (Bay State Banner, 2005)  
Davis was trained as an architect and community development activist. He 
worked for a neighborhood nonprofit at the time. Davis and Jones were once 
neighbors, and Davis’s wife attended the New England Conservatory of Music. He 
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worked for the Greater Roxbury Development Corporation, which was one of three 
community development corporations in Boston that dated back to the War on 
Poverty, called Title VII CDCs.   
So how did its two prime movers go about the undertaking of creating 
Mandela? Davis explained: “We sponsored monthly breakfast meetings at the 
Harvard Faculty Club.  As a Harvard alumn[us], I had access to the faculty club.  
And this is with people in the community.  Why do we do that?  Well, we knew 
that if we said, hey, come, and let’s meet at the local, you know, breakfast joint on 
the street, people wouldn't take it take it as serious.  But when we kind of hosted 
these little breakfast meetings at the Harvard Faculty Club, people came.  And they 
came with a fairly serious intent; they took us more seriously.  So Gloria Fox, Mel 
King, and many, many others, we met with, for a year one-on-one at breakfast 
meetings. So well before the campaign, we seeded the idea throughout the political 
leadership and community leadership, partly to give people the ability to either 
claim or disclaim us based on their own personal agendas.” (Davis, 2015) 
As a Boston Globe article pointed out, much of Mandela would have 
contained institutions such as Harvard Medical School, the Boston Museum of 
Fine Arts, Northeastern University, and the John F. Kennedy Library.  Add to that 
the number of Whites who still lived in the area that would become Mandela.  The 
article reported, “Coincidentally or not, the targeted area encompasses the 
predominantly minority neighborhoods. This has led many to assume it is strictly a 
minority affair, but white residents also lived throughout the targeted areas of 
Dorchester, Mattapan, Jamaica Plain, the South End, the Fenway and Roxbury. 
The presence of white residents who elected to live in an integrated neighborhood 
is a sign that the racial climate in Boston has improved. That makes secession a 
Boston issue.” (Patterson, Boston Globe, October 12, 1986, p. 72).  
 
The Town of Rocksbury 
 
It is said that the name "Rocksbury" or "Rocksborough" was taken from the 
puddingstone, a type of rock common to the area.  Historically, the Roxbury area 
extended to Dorchester on the south, Brookline to the north, Dedham to the west, 
and Boston on the east. In 1630, it became the sixth town to become incorporated 
in Massachusetts. The earliest settlement of the area, known as Eliot Square, 
centered around the First Church in Roxbury. The entire village of Roxbury was 
housed on “Roxbury Street” with scattered farms.  
In 1652, Roxbury was a quiet suburban village with an estimated population 
of about 700 people.  The number of residents increased very slowly to 1,467 in 
the colonial census of 1765.  The Town of West Roxbury, which also included a 
part of Jamaica Plain, separated from Roxbury in 1861 and was annexed to Boston 
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in 1874. By 1868, the growth of Roxbury was noticeable in terms of structures and 
population, and residents voted in favor of annexation to take advantage of 
Boston’s city services. In many ways, Roxbury was the first suburb of Boston, 
controlled largely by wealthy families who worked in Boston proper but wanted a 
country home.  
For much of its early history, Roxbury was politically and geographically 
isolated from Boston. The first settlers were English emigrants, the Puritans who 
sailed with John Winthrop, first governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. As 
Bailey, Turner, and Hayden write in Lower Roxbury A Community of Treasures in 
the City of Boston, “Old Roxbury extended for eight miles from east to west and 
two miles north to south and included present-day West Roxbury, Jamaica Plain, 
and part of Brookline. The ‘Neck,’ the long narrow strip of land connecting 
Roxbury to Boston, was more than a mile long and had a dam on either side to 
prevent overflow from the tides. In the early years of settlement the area was 
fortified to protect whites from attacks by Native Americans.”  (Bailey et al., 2)  In 
1846, Roxbury became a city, and remained so until Boston annexed it in 1868. 
The fact that Roxbury was once a separate city and encompassed many of the areas 
sought in the 1986 Mandela proposal makes the idea of secession less far-fetched 
than one might have first considered.   
A salvo titled “A Roxbury Government Open Letter” appeared in the Bay 
State Banner in 1965, written by a young Byron Rushing. A newcomer to 
Cambridge and Boston, the New York native entered Harvard University in the fall 
of 1960. He wrote, “If the Negro community of Boston can be characterized by 
one word, that word is "powerless." We have no power. And we will never be free 
unless we are strong, unless we can acquire power. The weak can't help but be 
slaves. The primary political issue for the Negro in Roxbury (as it is for Negroes in 
most northern cities) is the acquisition of power. The question is "How?" (Rushing, 
1965) 
He continued, “Certain community leaders have recently been talking about 
setting up a Roxbury government. This is an excellent idea—only if they really 
mean it. I'm tired of symbolic actions and educational campaigns. I am ready to 
fight to win—for real power.” (Rushing, 1965) His letter continues: 
 
 Almost a hundred years ago, the City of Roxbury decided 
to become a part of Boston. They did this for several 
reasons: to get the benefits of the water and sewage 
systems, to have the trolley tracks extended to Roxbury, to 
have gas lines put in for street lights and cooking stoves, to 
get their streets paved, etc. Now a hundred years later most 
of the functions that the city of Boston gave to Roxbury no 
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longer come from Boston. Our transportation is controlled 
by the MBTA a state chartered agency to which Boston, 
along with suburban cities and towns, is a member. Our 
water is supplied by a similar organization, the MDC. 
What do we receive from the City of Boston? The Police, 
the schools, the Welfare Department, the Sanitation 
Department, and DPW, the Park Dept. Who in Roxbury is 
satisfied with the services supplied by any of these 
branches of our city government? (Rushing, 1965) 
 
What Rushing could not have realized was that 20 years later, his article 
would be read by two people who also yearned for true freedom and the purest 
exercise of democracy—Jones and Davis, the founders of GRIP. Davis invited 
Rushing to come speak to a discussion group of “young professional/intellectual 
black men.”(Bingham, 2014)  Of Jones, Rushing recalled: “So, he had done some 
research, and one of the things he came across was an article that I had written in 
the Bay State Banner in the 1960s about whether Roxbury should be independent 
or not.”  (Bingham, 2014)   
According to Rushing: 
So, we had talked about that in the 60s and it never picked up, but it 
never got any legs.  There were a group of people thinking about it 
and then we couldn’t get much support for it, and so this little 
article had just been there, but Andrew had found it.  And he 
suggested at this meeting that we should do that except those 
boundaries weren’t going to work and he wanted to know what I 
thought about coming up with boundaries, what could we look at 
and so that’s how I got into this.  And then he kept working on it, 
we kept looking at what political thing could we do, and he began 
organizing around this, he organized a group because what he was 
still talking about for a name was Roxbury, so he called it GRIP, 
Greater Roxbury Incorporation Project, because that was what we’d 
be doing, we’d be incorporating a political area into a city.  
(Rushing, 2014) 
 
A City Called Nairobi: East Palo Alto 
 
To those who asked how Mandela could survive on its own, proponents of 
Mandela pointed to the incorporation of East Palo Alto, a small community north 
of Palo Alto, California in the San Mateo Valley. The original organizers behind 
the incorporation of East Palo Alto initially wanted to rename the area Nairobi.  An 
 21 
interesting side note was that a young Ronald Bailey, who would later come to 
Boston to chair the Department of African-American Studies at Northeastern 
University in 1989, worked on the project.  He authored, along with Diane Turner 
and Robert Hayden, an indispensable, independently published history, Lower 
Roxbury: A Community of Treasures in the City of Boston, with a preface by 
Danette Jones of the Lower Roxbury Community Corporation. 
Bailey wrote, “As a graduate student at Stanford, I worked on the history 
and incorporation efforts of East Palo Alto, California, often called Nairobi.” 
(Bailey et al., 1989) While East Palo Alto was successful in creating its own city, 
there were several differences between that situation and the Mandela struggle.  By 
the 1980s, when East Palo Alto achieved this feat, the area was largely African 
American after many families moved into the area in the 1950s.  
While advocates contended that a precedent had already been set, there are 
several distinguishing factors that make this comparison flawed.  East Palo Alto 
was already set apart by a river and, unlike Roxbury, had never been incorporated. 
Unlike Roxbury, East Palo Alto has always been a separate entity since its 
founding as an unincorporated community. It is also in San Mateo County, while 
Palo Alto is in Santa Clara County. The two cities are separated by San 
Francisquito Creek.  
As Nancy Haggard-Gilson has argued, “The experience of East Palo Alto, 
however, should prove that those skeptical of Mandela's viability were correct. 
East Palo Alto is bankrupt. Its inability to provide services to its citizens forced the 
surrounding county, with aid from the state of California, to offer short-term 
contracts for police and emergency crews. More critically, the city continues to be 
economically isolated from the surrounding area. It has not been able to translate a 
resolve to defend minority rights into economic development in the absence of an 
indigenous, independent business base. As conditions have worsened, East Palo 
Alto has become politically divided.”  (Haggard-Gilson, 1995) 
The founders of Mandela could have looked closer to home for two 
examples of annexation towns frustrated with the poor city services they were 
receiving. Charlestown and Hyde Park both experienced political moments in 
which secession was proposed as a viable option, as documented in Jim Vrabel’s A 
People’s History of Boston.  
According to Vrabel, “On September 24, 1962… more than 2,000 [Hyde 
Park residents] filled the auditorium of Hyde Park High to show how upset they 
were that their location would provide no protection from the threat of the 
proposed highway. They were treated that evening to a particularly inept 
presentation by a state DPW official, whose best argument for the Southwest 
Expressway seemed to be that it would displace fewer people than the Inner Belt. 
Five residents were not persuaded, and, soon after, many signed a petition to 
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secede from Boston. They sent it to the Massachusetts legislature fifty years to the 
day after Hyde Park had allowed itself to be annexed.” (Vrabel, 2014, 23) 
Vrabel continues: “On April 27, 1965 more than 400 [Charlestown 
residents] descended on City Hall for a four-and-a-half-hour hearing described in a 
front-page Boston Globe headline as ‘the wildest session ever staged in City Hall’s 
council chambers.’ Not long after that, 350 residents signed a petition asking the 
state legislature ‘to authorize the citizens of Charlestown to form a government 
completely independent of the city. Charlestown didn’t secede from Boston, and 
urban renewal did proceed. But it did so in a way that was more carefully thought 
out.’”  (Vrabel, 2014, 23) 
 
Urban Renewal or Urban “Removal” 
 
 Boston’s Black population has never been particularly large.  
Although Boston's total population was close to 800,000 in 1930 and the 
city ranked as one of the nation’s most heavily populated municipalities 
during this decade, Boston had fewer Black residents percentage-wise than 
any other urban center whose population was greater than 500,000. 
 Although Boston did have a relatively sizable Black population at the turn of 
the century, the city did not witness the rather dramatic surge in Black population, 
brought about by the Great Migration in other cities, during the years 1910 to 
1925. Rather, Boston's Black population increased more gradually, by 20.5 
percent, during the decade of 1910 to 1920, and from1920 to 1930, 25.8 percent.  
That percentage growth did not dramatically alter the absolute percentage of Black 
presence in the city on the eve of American involvement in World War II.  In 
1910, Blacks comprised 2 percent of Boston’s population.  In 1920, they were 2.2 
percent of the population; in 1930, 2.6 percent; and 1940, 3 percent.  Thus, race 
relations in Boston during the first half of the twentieth century would be shaped to 
some degree by the relatively small size of the Black population.  It was small but 
quite complex in its ethnic character and place of origin.   
More than one-third of its Black residents were born in Massachusetts, 
allowing Boston to enjoy the distinction among large non-southern cities of having 
the highest percentage of native-born Black residents.  Moreover, one-sixth of 
Boston’s Black population was foreign-born, emigrating principally from Jamaica, 
Barbados, other small British colonial possessions, and the Cape Verdean islands 
off the West Coast of Africa.5  
                                                        
5 See Johnson, Violet Showers. The Other Black Bostonians: West Indians in Boston, 1900–1950, Blacks in the 
Diaspora. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006 and Halter, Marilyn. Between Race and Ethnicity: Cape 
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As a result of Boston’s increasing population, the Black community slowly 
began to move from Beacon Hill into the expanded South End area. With the 
development of an affordable public transportation system, there was a migration 
into Roxbury and Dorchester, which had previously functioned as suburban 
bedroom communities.  
The 1950s and 1960s brought many economic changes and spurred the rapid 
growth and development in terms of Black migration to Boston, although during 
World War I Boston’s share of the Great Migration was smaller than it was in 
other northern cities. The historically small Black population of Boston grew in the 
post–World War II era, when more African Americans migrated to the city in 
search of jobs and better political and economic opportunities. Unlike immigrants 
from abroad, notably Irish Americans, racial bias prevented Blacks from securing 
the government jobs that employed a large percentage of the city's workforce. Of 
these “newcomers," many came directly from the South, while many others came 
to Boston after a relatively short stay in one of the other ports of entry to the north 
(Philadelphia, New York, Chicago, Detroit, Baltimore, etc.).  
As more African Americans and West Indians arrived in the city in search of 
jobs and improved political and economic opportunities, they were met with an 
influx of immigrants from Europe that created unique pressures and conflicts for 
the relatively small Black population.  Racist hiring practices, however, often 
prevented Blacks from reaping the benefits of the financial growth of the city. In 
the 1970s, Black workers earned only about two-thirds of what their White 
counterparts did. A legacy of redlining and discriminatory lending practices 
prevented Blacks from moving into such outlying areas as Hyde Park and West 
Roxbury, where many working-class people owned their own homes. Blacks were 
also kept out of poorer White working-class neighborhoods, such as South Boston, 
Charlestown, and East Boston. 6 As African Americans were pushed out of the 
historically Black neighborhoods of the South End and Lower Roxbury, ghettos 
began to emerge in the areas surrounding Roxbury, Mattapan, and Dorchester. The 
schools and housing in these neighborhoods were inadequate and lacked basic 
resources.  
 At the same time, Boston underwent many structural changes in the name of 
urban renewal as entire neighborhoods were demolished to make way for the city's 
expansion. As Lew Finfer, a longtime Boston-community organizer, states, “In 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Verdean American Immigrants, 1860–1965, Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Centennial Series. Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1993. 
6 For a more detailed analysis of the effects of these changes, consult Yona Ginsberg’s Jews in a Changing 
Neighborhood: The Study of Mattapan (1975).   This created an environment of hostile racial encampment and 
segregated ethnic neighborhoods.  
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1958 the West End Urban Renewal program began, in which the West End 
neighborhood was torn down to build Charles River Park luxury apartments. West 
Enders were promised the right of return, but few could afford the market-rate 
apartments they were offered. Jerome Rappaport, a former aide to Mayor Hynes, 
was picked as developer of the Charles River Park Apartments. Rappaport served 
as a major power broker for his interests and real estate interests in Boston over the 
next 50 years.” (Finfer, 2016) 
 According to Finfer, there were several key events that defined the struggle 
and in many ways paved the way for the Mandela initiative to come, including a 
citywide and metropolitan campaign to stop the proposed 10-lane Inner Belt/ I-95 
extension that was to go from Route 128/Dedham, through Boston and Cambridge, 
and connect to I-93 in Somerville (also included was extending I-95 through 
Lynn). He stated, “A famous sign was painted on the railroad crossing in Jamaica 
Plain: ‘Stop I-95—People Before Highways’ to symbolize the organizing 
campaign.”  As Finfer recalls, “In 1970, Governor Sargent announced a 
moratorium on construction of this highway. Funds were later shifted to instead 
build the new MBTA Orange Line and the Southwest Corridor parks. It is for that 
reason that a memorial with the history of this organizing, recognizing the many 
neighborhood leaders who worked on this, is located right outside of the Roxbury 
Crossing MBTA station.” (Finfer, 2016)  
 Nationally, 1968 proved to be a most tumultuous year, and Boston would 
see its fair share of violence. In a response to the riots that followed Martin Luther 
King’s death, Mayor White and the Boston business community initiated three 
programs that, while perhaps well intended, exacerbated the major problems 
confronting rioting communities like Grove Hall. (Finfer, 2016) 
The riots of 1968, which seemed to be sparked by the King assassination, 
were in fact a reaction to decades of injustice and inequality. Despite Boston’s 
exclusion from those cities most well known for urban rebellions, only a year 
earlier, the city was the site of the so-called welfare riot of 1967, during which 
local businesses were destroyed and scores of people were injured. What began as 
a peaceful demonstration turned tragic when Boston police officers broke up the 
assembled crowd. Their action led to an angry mob gathering in support of the 
protesters.   
On April 6, 1968, nearly 5,000 people attended a rally organized by the 
Black United Front, which was created out of the riots and headed by King, 
Turner, and Byron Rushing, at White Stadium in Franklin Park, at which a list of 
demands was presented that included: “(the transfer of the ownership of ... [White-
owned] businesses to the black community, ... every school in the black 
community shall have all-black staff, ... [and] control of all public, private, and 
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municipal agencies that affect the lives of the people in this community."  (Vrabel, 
2004, 335) 
In the wake of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fair Housing 
Act of 1968 outlawed discrimination in the housing market and suddenly made it 
possible for many Black families to purchase homes in any neighborhood. Finfer 
stated, “This led to the formation of the Boston Banks Urban Renewal Group 
(BBURG), which existed between 1968 and 1972.  In this well-intended but 
ultimately failed initiative, banks promised to make home ownership loans to 
African American families. However, in this program Black families could buy 
homes only in existing Black neighborhoods and the then predominantly White 
and predominantly Jewish sections of Mattapan and western Dorchester. This 
‘reverse redlining’ led to blockbusting by realtors and racial conflict as 
neighborhoods turned from 90% White to 90% Black in only four years.” Authors 
Hillel Levine and Lawrence Harmon, in their 1992 book The Death of an 
American Jewish Community: A Tragedy of Good Intentions, wrote: "The Boston 
Banks Urban Renewal Group program was to housing what court-ordered 
desegregation was to education: while creating the impression of fairness, in reality 
it created more problems than it solved." (Levine and Harmon, 1992)  
 The White working-class victims of the city's transformation responded by 
electing leaders who would defend the neighborhoods at all costs, including the 
right to retain their own neighborhood schools.  In the face of municipal power and 
the federal court, anti-busing extremists resorted to violence to protest against 
school desegregation that led to violence in the streets and nearly daily fights in the 
hallways and classrooms of Boston's public schools.  Competition around jobs was 
a main source of tension in the city, where the contestation over de facto residential 
segregation and urban renewal had more far-reaching consequences. Although 
increased opportunity led to some occupational and economic gains for Blacks, 
compared to Whites’, those figures remained low. Unlike other cities that had 
sustained periods of Black migration, Boston's Black community continued to have 
difficulty in achieving political parity with the long-established White ethnic 
population because of its relatively small numbers. In spite of the victory of 
Thomas Atkins for city councilor in 1967, African Americans were unable to win 
many seats in local and state government. Without a political voice, municipal 
jobs, which were often reserved for the relatives of White elected officials, 
continued to remain elusive to African Americans.  This situation would improve 
somewhat in the 1970s and 1980s, when King ran his mayoral races of 1979 and 
1983. 
 
A Rainbow Coalition 
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 The major issue coming out of the 1960s for Black Bostonians was 
“community control” and self-determination. By the 1980s, that translated 
into land control and a say in the development of their own neighborhoods. 
One could argue that land control was perhaps just as pertinent for the 
1980s as school desegregation was for the 1970s. The quest for control 
would manifest itself in many ways in Boston’s political scene. Yet the 
failure to establish Mandela showed a reluctance of a cross section of 
Boston residents to accept this unorthodox approach to Black 
empowerment.  Corporate leaders clearly did not see Mandela to be in their 
best interests, and a number of White residents and some Black leaders 
opposed the proposition.” (Boston Globe Magazine, April 12, 1987, 19) 
By 1985, the number of Blacks and Latinos elected mayor in American cities had 
grown dramatically, from zero in 1960 to twenty-seven Black and three Latinos. 
They were mayors of cities with populations of over 50,000. (Browning, Marshall, 
and Tabb, 2003, 5) The lack of Black elected officials in Boston was a major 
problem with no easy answers. In 1953, 1961, 1963, and 1965, King, a social 
worker and community activist, ran unsuccessfully for a seat on the Boston School 
Committee. As with many other candidates, there was just not a strong enough 
base to mount a successful campaign.  
For Blacks to win elections in Boston, as in most major American cities, it 
was essential to form political coalitions that often included large groups of 
minorities and progressive Whites.  By the 1960s, Blacks and Latinos had gained 
access to city jobs, expanding their influence and improving city programs. The 
civil rights movement and local mobilization efforts became critical tests not only 
of minorities’ ability to sustain a high level of political activity but also of the 
promise of the democratic participation of all citizens.  
A multiracial coalition and trailblazing experiment in minority politics was 
realized in 1983 when King, who had been elected to the state’s legislature in 
1973, mounted a serious bid in the Boston mayoral campaign against City 
Councilor Raymond Flynn and five other White candidates. King was first elected 
as a state representative from the South End and served in the Legislature until 
1982.  King mobilized a "rainbow coalition" through a voter registration campaign 
aimed at Blacks and Latinos. With endorsements from national Black leadership at 
the time, such as Chicago mayor Harold Washington and Democratic presidential 
contender Jesse Jackson, King's registration drive swelled the rolls by 25 percent in 
the months before the election. (Erie, 1988, 187) Although he ultimately lost to 
Flynn in the final election, King amassed a coalition that was an exercise in the 
effectiveness of minorities banding together—and attracting White allies—to 
further their political agenda.  
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This feat becomes more impressive as one imagines the historic record of 
racial divisiveness in Boston, including the violent episodes during the school 
desegregation crisis that fractured the city. Mandela was in some ways an 
outgrowth of the 1983 campaign.  Jennings makes an interesting point in terms of 
the presumed connection between King’s political campaign and the Mandela 
campaign. “The way I would explain that piece of politics, it was part of a 
changing mindset in Boston.  It was part of a mindset that said, ‘You know, we 
have a right—people who have not been at the table downtown—we have a right 
to think about what this city should be like and how it should be organized’ and 
so…in one sense, Mel King and the Rainbow Coalition and that whole mindset is a 
frontal assault on continuing racial and economic injustice in the city of Boston.  
It’s a frontal political assault.  Mandela is sort of a different front.  It’s not a frontal 
assault in a sense.  But it says, ‘Look, I—we think we can do better than you.’  
And so we’re going to push an idea that also reflects, just like Mel King and the 
Rainbow Coalition reflect, an idea that, you know, a city can be a just city.  A city 
is not beautiful if it’s not a just city.” (Jennings, interview with authors, 2016)  
King was a dedicated enemy of racial segregation in schools and housing. 
As a result of redistricting in 1971, Blacks improved their chances of gaining more 
than just one seat for Roxbury in the Legislature. Redistricting brought four Blacks 
into the State House the next election year: Doris Bunte (the first African 
American woman to serve in the Legislature), Bill Owens, Royal Bolling Jr., and 
King. This cluster formed the Massachusetts Black Caucus, a new institution that 
played a key role in municipal and state politics. (Browning et al., 2003, 115)  
As a long outspoken and visible leader of the Black community, King set the 
framework for a Rainbow Coalition long before he ran for mayor. By being 
outspoken on a number of issues concerning Blacks and other groups, he was able 
to draw widespread support from the women's, anti-racist, and gay rights 
movements of Boston.  According to William Nelson, author of Black Atlantic 
Politics: Dilemmas of Political Empowerment in Boston and Liverpool, “Mel King 
was able to mobilize an unprecedented number of progressives to volunteer and 
work for his campaign.  These individuals were attracted to King’s persona, his 
integrity, his track record as a committed, community activist, and his vision of a 
new Boston sensitive to the needs of the poor. The message he delivered was so 
captivating that much of his platform was adopted by his opponents.” (Nelson, 
2000, 123) 
It actually seemed like King was at the forefront of a multi-issue, multi-
group movement, as his Rainbow Coalition was a true multiracial alliance of 
Latinos, Asians, Blacks, feminists, and gay rights activists. He was the first African 
American to qualify for a final mayoral election in Boston. (Browning et al., 2003, 
118) 
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Despite its success in propelling King to second in the primary and into the 
final, the Rainbow Coalition did not succeed in electing him as mayor. A reason 
for this, as one observer notes, is that after the primary election, a change in 
strategy to make more of an attempt to reach out to White voters may have 
alienated many Black and other minority voters. This decision corresponded to an 
effort to blur the lines of the rainbow—to make it seem less like a Black 
empowerment and anti-racist movement and more like a broad humanistic appeal 
that included White neighborhoods. In the final tally, 128,578 voters supported 
Flynn; King received 69,015 votes.  At 69.5 percent, turnout for the election was 
the highest for a mayoral election in Boston since 1949. (Vrabel, 2014, 358) 
Despite his loss, King took 35 percent of votes in the final election. His campaign 
formed a veritable multiracial grassroots movement that would have implications 
for Boston's future.  
More significantly, King’s campaign forced the mayor-elect to take 
positions on a number of issues of concern to Blacks and other minorities.  Flynn 
had won less than 5 percent of the vote in Roxbury and had very little support 
among people in communities of color. As mayor, Flynn spoke about being deeply 
committed to improving the city and becoming more effective in the development 
of Boston’s neighborhoods. He had been one of the most vocal politicians in 
opposition to school desegregation during Boston’s busing crisis, but not one who 
incited violence. This has been well documented. Again, Jeanne Theoharis is 
helpful here: “While the newspapers tended to portray their politics as 
interchangeable, Flynn and King stood for two different sides of Boston. Flynn, a 
white state representative and city councilman, had originally been opposed to 
court-order busing and school desegregation but now embraced a vision of a united 
city. King, a black community activist and former state representative, had been 
active in the school desegregation campaign as well as other community initiatives 
against the BRA and other development.” (Theoharis, 1996)  
Perhaps it came as a surprise to some observers when King, after building 
such a multiracial coalition, endorsed “Mandela,” which most people considered to 
be a nationalist-separatist project. Was there a contradiction between the Rainbow 
Coalition and Mandela?   As Kennedy and Tilly write, “King was singled out for 
particularly vicious criticism in articles that predicted support for Mandela would 
end his political career. Even after the defeat of the referendum, Flynn and the 
Globe blasted politicians who supported Mandela as well as, in the Globe's words, 
‘politicians who counseled “maybe” on this important issue.’ (Kennedy and Tilly, 
1987, 24)  At the time of Mandela, Jennings was quoted as saying, “The white 
powerholders of Boston are doing their best to control black leadership in the 
city—to suppress insurgent black leaders, and to facilitate the emergence of 
‘cooperative’ black leaders.” (Kennedy and Tilly, 1987, 24)   
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In his campaign for mayor, Flynn made a populist appeal to many lower-
income White voters in which he promised a move away from downtown 
development and toward community and neighborhood development. His coalition 
consisted principally of White working-class people hurt by the policies of the 
administration of former mayor Kevin White. Flynn was also able to add an 
economist’s approach that emphasized growth and an economic share of the pie for 
lower-class Whites as well as minorities. 
As Peter Dreier notes, “The Flynn administration had been given a mandate 
by the voter to ‘share the prosperity’ of Boston’s downtown economic boom.” He 
goes on to say, “What the Flynn administration inherited was a city of contrasts. 
By 1984, Boston’s economy was well along to shifting from a manufacturing base 
to a service-based economy, spurring the development of downtown buildings, 
university and medical research centers, and high-technology industries. This 
economic boom created new problems and compounded some old ones. 
Neighborhoods near downtown or close to universities and hospitals were 
becoming gentrified, pricing working-class and moderate-income residents out of 
the market… lower-income neighborhoods faced redlining and disinvestment; the 
minority unemployment rate was twice that of the city at large; and many of the 
jobs held by Boston residents were in the low-paying portion of the new service-
oriented economy.” (Krumholz and Clavel, 1994) 
Dreier notes, “The inconsistency between Boston’s thriving economy and 
the socioeconomic conditions of the city’s working class provided the Flynn 
administration with a mandate for a redistributionist policy agenda. The pattern of 
development described previously had created economic prosperity for some and 
had made life difficult for many others, especially in the areas of jobs and 
housing.” (Krumholz and Clavel, 1994) To his credit, Flynn appeared to want to 
truly live up to his populist rhetoric of the campaign.  Flynn became known as 
“mayor of the neighborhoods.”  King’s loss, however, brought to the fore the 
issues of community control and self-determination in Roxbury. At the end of the 
day, the idea of Mandela became a threat. As Gloria Fox, a state representative 
from Roxbury since 1986, recalls, “We set up hearings, not only in the community, 
but here at the State House as well. It got very, very, very, very controversial. A 
number of times it got very, very heated, with people wanting to come to blows—
you know, around us wanting our independence, wanting to secede from the city of 
Boston.  Thinking and talking about having our own police force, having our own 
fire department, having our own money, having our own tax rates, having our own 
businesses, and reaping the profits of those businesses only for Roxbury became 
very, very dangerous to the other community.  And when I say the other 
community I do mean the White community and those people—those Black people 
that supported that—that group of people.  It became very, very dangerous, and so 
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people got even more serious in trying to block how we were getting attention.” 
(Interview with Jeremy Bingham, 2014)    
King, interviewed about Mandela in 1990, remarked, “I think again that this 
is a struggle for the land and a struggle for the money. And I think that the issue 
around Mandela is principally a struggle for the money. And if people believe in 
themselves and in the fact that they have the capacity to fashion out a community 
that will provide for its residents and its people in ways that are vastly superior to 
what is being offered to them now, then they should go for it.” (Turner, 1990) 
  
“Yes We Stay, No We Go” 
 
According to a Boston Globe article, “The failure to establish Mandela 
showed a reluctance of a cross section of Boston residents to accept this 
unorthodox approach to Black empowerment.  Corporate leaders clearly did not 
see Mandela to be in their best interests, and a number of White residents and some 
Black leaders opposed the proposition.” (Boston Globe Magazine, April 12, 1987, 
19) State representatives Byron Rushing and Royal Bolling Jr. were Mandela 
supporters, as was Chuck Turner, a community activist, later a Boston city 
councilor representing Roxbury, and cofounder of the Greater Roxbury 
Neighborhood Authority.  State Senator Royal Bolling Sr. came out in opposition 
to Mandela. Joyce Ferriabough-Bolling, longtime political consultant and wife of 
the late Bruce Bolling Sr., ran the opposition campaign. According to a Bay State 
Banner article, after hearing Jones grumbling about Flynn's "plantation politics," 
Ferriabough-Bolling confronted him. "How do you want your ass kicking?" she 
asked. "Over easy or well done?" (Bay State Banner, November 11, 2010)  
That same article notes that Jones acknowledged that the Greater Roxbury 
Incorporation Project should have been hatched at kitchen tables in Roxbury rather 
than over linen tablecloths at the Harvard Faculty Club. Ferriabough-Bolling 
respected Jones’s passion but questioned his judgment. Davis asserts that Mandela 
was never about “secession,” but rather “incorporation.”  Mandela “wasn’t a 
secessionist movement, it was an incorporation.  And we never—that was what we 
could never kind of overcome, because we also at the same time leaned on the 
Black Nationalist rhetoric. It was very easy for the media to take that rhetoric and 
[call us] secessionists.  So we just lived with that.  But that was not what was the 
intellectual or the tactical framework that we were working from.  So tactically, 
incorporation, we felt, was a move that had a very, very powerful impact because it 
affected so much of the legal and economic structure of the city that we knew if we 
made a credible move to that, we were going to get reaction, all kinds of reactions.  
And we did.  Some good, some bad, some predictable, some unpredictable.” 
(Interview with Zebulon Miletsky, 2015)   
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Kennedy and Tilly agree on the strategy of Black Nationalist rhetoric, 
writing: “GRIP appealed for votes based on several rationales: reversing the 
decades of racist neglect experienced by Roxbury, controlling the impending flood 
of investment, and simply gaining accountable government. Although the 
reincorporation strategy clearly draws on black nationalism, GRIP often adopted 
moderate and even ‘all-American’ rhetoric: GRIP's main position paper begins, 
‘Independence. It is as much a part of the Massachusetts spirit as it is the American 
one, if not more so.’ GRIP's literature emphasized, "Our community is integrated 
and our city will be, too.” (Kennedy and Tilly, 1987, 23)  
Some even went as far as to accuse Jones and Davis of making money off 
the Mandela initiative, but Davis said that was not the case: 
 
We weren’t accepting money from outside sources.  We [could 
have] had lots of money from wealthy people all around the 
country.  LA, Chicago, Houston.  We could’ve gotten millions of 
dollars to support the campaign, but we chose not to do that because 
it would undermine the overall thesis.  That is, the community 
ought to be able to support itself.  And so it wasn’t about winning, 
per se.  The win was a much more strategic vision of community-
felt empowerment.  So the fatalistic argument, which said, “hey, is 
this making a move to shake up the city?”  was a very thin analysis.  
It was a lot deeper than that.  We weren’t interested in making 
Flynn’s days difficult.  That was not what that was about.  
(Interview with Zebulon Miletsky, 2015) 
 
 While Davis brought a theoretical approach, Jones should be credited with 
the imaginative way of getting Mandela on the ballot.  Of Jones and Davis, 
Rushing said: 
And they decide that one of the organizing tools to use is to 
get a vote on this issue, but the only way they can do that is to 
have a vote in state representative districts.  So, in 
Massachusetts we allow nonbinding questions to be put on the 
ballot in state representative districts because the questions are 
to get the state representative to know what its constituents are 
thinking.  So, you can put a question, you have to do this by 
petition, it’s not many names, and then on the ballot in the 
next state election you could have a question like, we believe 
our state representatives should vote for incorporation.  So, 
you could put that question on and that’s the tool that they 
use.  And so we have in a state election during that time in 
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about six or seven state representative districts, there are 
several that they put this question.  And that state 
representative district might be, the geography of that state 
representative district might wholly be included in the area 
they planned to have become the city or it might just be 
partially included. Because they did their whole organizing 
around geography around precincts and so they looked for all 
the precincts that had majority Black people in them and put 
them together.  And, of course, get[ting] back to what I said 
about how segregated the city was, it was no big problem. So 
you put them all together and you have, except for one 
exception, it was a continuous area…  That was this public 
housing project that had been built on a peninsula that stuck 
out into the ocean called Columbia Point, and that precinct of 
course was predominantly Black, and now it’s separated from 
the mass of Black people in this city. (Interview with Jeremy 
Bingham, 2014) 
 
Jones was also particularly effective in keeping Mandela in the media thanks 
to his experience as a journalist. Once a writer for the Boston Globe and a public 
relations maven, Jones knew how to fan the flames. From the State House steps, 
joined by King, he held one of many news conferences on October 13, 1986, 
leading up to the vote in November, in which he read aloud a letter written to 
Michael Dukakis, urging the Massachusetts governor to appoint a special panel "to 
carefully and objectively examine the structural feasibility of municipal 
incorporation for our community."  The letter stated, "The legacy of discrimination 
has left deep scars among the youth of our community. Their rage is causing them 
to self-destruct before our eyes and something must be done . . . This process must 
be halted and the seeds of a new legacy must be sown." (Boston Globe, October 
14, 1986) The governor was unavailable for comment, but issued a statement that 
read in part: "While there are obviously legitimate concerns within the community, 
the only way to address those concerns and to solve the problems that come about 
is to continue to work together. Secession does not accomplish that." (Boston 
Globe, Oct. 14, 1986)  
 In what would become a predictable volley between Flynn and Mandela 
advocates, Flynn released a similar statement: “We welcome the comments by the 
governor's office which stress that secession is not an answer but is in fact a step 
backwards. The answer that is clearly in the best interest of the state and the city is 





The opposition to Mandela was strong and varied, with activists, business 
owners, and community representatives standing in opposition to the creation of a 
separate city. The One Boston Campaign was formed specifically to lobby against 
the secession question. Led primarily by Black clergy loyal to Flynn, One Boston 
members included Rev. Charles Stith and Rev. Bruce Wall, among others. As 
Kennedy and Tilly write, “The One Boston Campaign, the organized group 
opposing Mandela, surfaced just about three weeks before the election, and was 
described by the Globe as ‘made up largely of minority clergymen and business 
and political leaders.’ Its two most visible spokespeople were Bruce Wall and 
Charles Stith, two relatively young black ministers. Both had challenged Flynn on 
racial issues in the past, and ironically Wall had even joined the call for a Roxbury 
plebiscite on separation in 1985. Wall pronounced that ‘A number of us have 
planted the seeds of opportunity over the last seven years or so, and we intend to 
stay here,’ but also acknowledged that he had in the past used the separation 
proposal as a source of leverage over Flynn. GRIP had botched the opportunities 
for such leverage, he argued, by taking itself too seriously.”  (Kennedy and Tilly, 
1987, 23) In the pages of The Boston Globe, however, Wall opined, ''This fans 
racism on all sides and is very self-defeating…We've been trying to work for racial 
harmony and sow the seeds of opportunity for people of color in Boston, not go 
back to ground zero.'' (Butterfield, New York Times, 1986)  
 Stith helped prepare an internal memo to Flynn that outlined the mayor’s 
strategy against Mandela. That opposition raised multiple issues, and information 
was disseminated mainly through the media outlets, raising the fears of residents—
especially the fear that taxes would go up and the new city would not be solvent.  
As Kennedy and Tilly write, “City officials were not to be outdone in the rush to 
denounce reincorporation for Roxbury. Rev. Bruce Wall, a critic of Mandela, told 
a Phoenix reporter that he had never seen Mayor Flynn so angry over an issue. A 
typical comment from Flynn was, ‘We should not slam the door on the future to 
make up for the problems of the past.’ Flynn's administration released a report that 
projected Mandela would run an annual deficit of over $135 million. In the month 
before the election, city workers were instructed to assume any inquiries about 
Roxbury (e.g., about assessments and land disposition) were coming from Mandela 
supporters and they were to withhold information until after the election. Flynn's 
political organization was mobilized to stop Mandela at the polls; city workers 
were seen at many polling places during working hours.” (Kennedy and Tilly, 
1987, 23) 
As State Representative Gloria Fox recalls:  
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The people that worked for the mayor, there was a lot of people 
from our community that worked for the mayor… anyone in the 
community that [was] even thinking of Roxbury incorporation or 
Mandela.  And that was—it got very nasty and it—it polarized 
our community and it’s not been repaired since then.  It still has 
an impact. We still remember who those people are, because they 
later went on to work for another man, so on so forth.  So it has 
had a negative impact historically that still remains 30 years later.  
One Boston didn’t mean one Boston at all; we refused to use the 
term.  It was so negative to those of us that were political in the 
African American community that we shot it down; we shot the 
term down as ONE Boston. (Fox, 2014) 
 
A joint statement issued by Flynn, Stith, and Boston City Council 
President Bruce Bolling Sr. titled, “Boston Reaffirms Unity Through 
Rejection Of Question 9,” was issued on election night in 1986.  It read: 
 
The people of Boston have voted a resounding "no!" to 
secession; They have rejected the divisiveness of the past and 
have embraced Unity. The secession proposal was 
counterproductive and polarizing in its attempt to divide Boston. 
The people said no! As of tonight, secession and division are 
issues of the past. As of tomorrow, we continue our joint efforts 
to build strong families and strong neighborhoods in Boston. We 
will continue to work to extend hope and opportunity to every 
resident in every neighborhood. This has been our agenda 
historically, as it is tonight and for the future. (Flynn, 1986) 
 
The argument was made that Roxbury developers and construction projects would 
also lose out on the linkage plans being offered at that time by Flynn. A typically 
one-sided article in the Boston Globe warned, “Those with the most to lose, the 
developers and construction people, stridently oppose secession. For them, 
secession would destroy the linkage plans proposed by Mayor Flynn's 
administration. Without being part of Boston, Roxbury developers would lose their 
30 percent stake in a $400-million project that links the construction of a 
downtown office building with a Roxbury commercial development.” (Boston 
Globe, 1986)  This was precisely the kind of gentrification that worried the 
planners of Mandela. Linkage was seen by some to not necessarily be the best 
thing for Roxbury. It demonstrates precisely how differently Blacks and Whites in 
Boston, on more than one occasion, had a way of seeing any one issue much 
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differently. The article continues, "Roxbury only recently has begun to attract 
outside capital, where before the only outside capital it attracted was in the form of 
government subsidies. Secession would put it even farther behind,” said John Cruz, 
head of Cruz Construction, one of the city’s most successful minority construction 
companies.  
 As Kennedy and Tilly write, “Black business owners interviewed by the 
Globe complained that reincorporation had little to offer them. Richard Taylor, 
president of the Minority Developers’ Association, stated, ‘I don't really believe 
much of the basis of the Mandela proposal is grounded in trying to solve business 
problems. I think its root is based in trying to gain political self-determination.... 
There has been no discussion on how it will affect the overall business climate.’ 
Some businessmen stood to lose directly—for example, the minority developers 
who have a piece of Flynn's $400 million deal. John Cruz, a minority contractor 
who is part of that deal, observed, "Roxbury only recently has begun to attract 
outside capital .... Secession would put it even farther behind." (Kennedy and Tilly, 
1987, 24) 
Royal Bolling Sr., another opponent of the movement, cited as real examples 
of progress his own election to the state Senate earlier in the year and the 
appointment of a Black superintendent to oversee the Boston Public Schools the 
year before, Laval S. Wilson.  Bolling Sr. stated: ''The irony of Mandela is that we 
are finally beginning to make progress towards empowerment within the 
mainstream.'' (Butterfield, New York Times, 1986)  
According to Kennedy and Tilly, then Black state senate candidate Bill 
Owens told a Globe columnist that while he "philosophically" supported the 
reincorporation and would vote for it, "I'm not encouraging people to vote for it 
because I don't have all the information." (Kennedy and Tilly, 1987, 24) 
Thomas Finneran, a state representative from Mattapan at that time and 
future speaker of the Massachusetts House, whose constituents were 75 percent 
Black due to re-districting, pointed out that there was certainly a backlash to the 
idea in his neighborhood, stating:  ''There is no question the backlash is there, there 
are extremists in the white community just as there are in the black community.'' 
He continued, ‘‘there are white people saying, 'You've been a drain on us for 
years—we'd be glad to get rid of the obligation.' '' Mr. Finneran added, ''They say, 
'You're the only ones using the schools anyway, so you can have them,' '' referring 
to the fact that 73 percent of Boston's public school students were members of 
minority groups. (New York Times, 1986) 
Nelson, author of Black Atlantic Politics, concluded, “With opposition 
across the city building like a brush fire, the Mandela proposal had little chance of 
victory at the ballot box…” In explaining the problems underlying the secession 
movement, he noted, “The campaign for Mandela never really got off the ground 
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in the Black community because Jones and Davis were political neophytes with no 
experience in community organizing. This problem was compounded by the fact 
that they had no constituency and were not connected to any existing community-
based organization capable of creating a constituency for them.” (Nelson, 2000, 
19) While Davis and Jones may not have had the acumen, residents had a need to 
feel like they had a stake in community control—to rid their community of drugs, 
to save their young people from the crack cocaine epidemic taking hold.  An 
interview conducted with a Mandela supporter was telling in this regard:  
If we had our own community, we wouldn't have drugs 
coming in here. We could stop that cold. I wouldn't have 
kids telling me what caliber rifle bullet they want. What 
the hell do they know about rifles? The mayor conned 
them; they get these house Negroes right out front. The 
area [Mandela] wasn't all Black. They said we were too 
poor to control our community. You had Harvard 
Medical School. You had the University of 
Massachusetts. You had Northeastern University 
and the New England School of Fine Arts. All kind of 
things. Anytime you don't have to put in sidewalks, storm 
drains, electrical wiring, build schools, you are pretty rich 
aren't you. This is the "Common Wealth" and it is one of 
the oldest and richest parts of the country. It's a constant 
re-education of who and what we are. There is a lot of 
leadership here to do what needs to be done to give us 
community control. (Nelson, 2000, 130)  
 
There were many nuances to the Mandela debate that often get lost.  The 
interviewee mentions four tax-exempt institutions—he may have meant the New 
England Conservatory of Music or Massachusetts College of Art and Design, 
instead of the “New England School of Fine Arts”—that bring up several 
important questions. What would have been the value of the residential and 
commercial tax bases of Mandela? What would have been the number and size of 
businesses there or the number of jobs?  
 A Los Angeles Times article, "Separatist City of Mandela: Boston Voting on 
Proposal to Let Black Areas Secede," stated:  
A study commissioned by Mayor Flynn and released in 
early October showed that Mandela would face a $135-
million deficit in its first year. The study said also that 
Mandela would have to raise residential property taxes 
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by 61% and commercial and industrial property taxes by 
44% to compensate for its reduced tax base. But Mandela 
supporters dismiss the study's figures as deliberately 
misleading. (Los Angeles Times, November 1, 1986)  
 
Another Los Angeles Times article, from September 7, 1986, "Irate Blacks Pushing 
for Secession in Boston," reported: “The secessionists argue that Mandela, despite 
having the city's highest crime rates and lowest incomes, would nonetheless have 
good prospects because of a solid tax base and its potential for business expansion. 
The Boston Globe quoted city fiscal officers as saying that a breakaway Roxbury, 
even with state aid, would face a $100-million budget deficit." (Los Angeles Times, 
September 7, 1986) 
The city’s estimate of Mandela’s fiscal prospects is contained in the 
following memo to Raymond Dooley, the administrative services director in 
charge of the budget and Flynn’s former campaign manager: 
 38 
 
Davis responded to this criticism by pointing out: 
There are two issues that we had that were extremely powerful 
elements for the economic side of incorporation.  One was city-
owned property.  If one were to go through an incorporation 
process, all of the municipal assets, not just assets in Roxbury, 
but all of the municipal assets for this to be in Boston would 
have to be reviewed because of the nature of the bond rating.  
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That was an issue that was not discussed.  It didn’t—the city 
was terrified that that would be put forward because of the 
potential impact on the city bond rating.  So from a municipal 
finance point of view, it was way in position to just look at tax 
revenues in and out of our expenses.  But if there was an 
effort—we forced the city to be explicit about how much 
money they were spending in Roxbury districts on municipal 
services.  But then people were always pissing and moaning 
about, oh, the city doesn’t spend enough money in our 
community. Well, we said, well, I think they might spend a lot.  
But let’s press them to do that.  And so by putting out our report 
on the fiscal health of the community, it forced the city to be 
explicit about that.  And that raised some questions.   
(Interview with Zebulon Miletsky, 2015) 
 
 Some of the briefing notes prepared for Flynn by his handlers also allow us 
to better understand the level of opposition to Mandela.  These were the major 
talking points of the “One Boston” campaign.  It could just as easily be called 
Flynn’s “I am a Bostonian” speech: 
I am unalterably opposed to popularizing the Roxbury 
secession concept in any way, as I would oppose considering 
the separation of any neighborhood from the City. This means 
that I am against considering neighborhood secession as a ballot 
question in any form or as legislation of any sort. The 
proposition is the exact opposite of the program I am pursuing 
as mayor. It is divisive. It pits neighborhood against 
neighborhood, race against race, and city resident against city 
resident. As a political leader I offer one theme more often than 
any other.  As Boston residents, there is more power to be 
realized by confronting the economic challenges we share than 
by dwelling on the fears and misunderstandings which divide 
us. The secession question is divisive and wrong headed. As 
mayor, I am striving to unite Boston residents in a common 
struggle against poverty, in a common crusade for better 
neighborhood services and development. I am striving to ensure 
that the benefits of downtown economic growth are shared 
equitably with all the neighborhoods of Boston. It is absurd to 
even suggest that any Boston neighborhood would fare better 
economically as a separate city. Tax classification has created a 
real return for Boston neighborhoods in terms of lower property 
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taxes and improving services. Linkage and Boston Jobs 
agreements offer new hope for those who have been 
traditionally left behind during periods of economic growth. It 
is folly to even consider surrendering these gains after years of 
shared struggle. I am a Bostonian. That word—Bostonian—
feels a bit new to me. It is not a word many of us are 
accustomed to saying. Perhaps that should change. I am proud 
of my neighborhood, but I also am very proud of my city. I am 
proud of both our diversity and our unity. I will surrender 
neither. I am a Bostonian. (Interview with Zebulon Miletsky 
and Tomás González, 1986) 
 
Internal memos commissioned by the Flynn administration revealed : “Over 
35% of the $799 million capital plan is earmarked for Mandela: This includes $6.9 
million in new police stations, $191 million to improve health care facilities 
(including a new BCH in-patient facility), $17 million to upgrade school facilities, 
and $15 million to improve parks.” (Interview with Zebulon Miletsky and Tomás 
González, 1986) To combat the supporters of Mandela, Flynn commissioned a 
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Along with Jones and Davis, Turner was a primary driver during the second attempt to pass 
Mandela.  Turner declared in a televised interview: “If we vote yes, this will be a mandate 
for the mayor to open the books of the city. The BRA [Boston Redevelopment Authority] 
says that there are 2,500 parcels of cleared land in District Seven alone, in Bruce Bolling’s 
[city council] district alone.  That’s 15 million square feet of land; you know what 15 million 
square feet of cleared land is?  That’s 300 football fields.”  (WGBH, 1988)   
In an interview, Turner recalled the following: “Economic implications were, you 
know, were also a strong driving force in terms of creating a new city, with job 
opportunities to the taking over of services that have been provided by the City of 
Boston.  At that time, one of the things that [was] a major driving force throughout 
the city was the gentrification of that particular period and the fact that the 
Roxbury-Dorchester area had the most, you know, land in the city.  I think the 
figure we used was ten football fields of available land for development.” (Turner, 
2016) 
When discussing this second campaign, many observers mention that the 
second effort came closer than the first, but that point is misleading if you are not 
looking at the overall ballots for each contest. There are several reasons for the 
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large drop-off in interest, not the least of which was the formation of the Dudley 
Street Neighborhood Initiative.  
 
Figure 4 
Overall Vote for the Mandela Referendum in 1986 and 1988 
1986   (141 precincts)  1988   (97 precincts) 
 
Yes  12,110  (20%)   11,643  (22%) 
No  35,273  (57%)   21,262  (40%) 
Blank  14,205  (23%)   19,659  (37%) 
Total  61,588     52,559 
Figure 5 
Comparison of Vote for Mandela Referendum in 1986 and 1988  
in Precincts Unchanged by 1987 Redistricting 
1986   (95 precincts)  1988   (95 precincts) 
 
Yes  7,000  (20%)   11,216  (22%) 
No  20,939 (59%)   20,298  (40%) 
Blank  7,778  (22%)   18,941  (38%) 
Total  35,717     50,455* 
 
Source: Boston Election Commission, 1986 and 1988. 
*1988 was a presidential election. 
 
 
As State Representative Byron Rushing, a key voice in the Mandela struggle 
and a legislator who helped advise the process, recalls about the second 
referendum: “So the next thing that we wanted to do after we lost having the vote, 
then the last thing that we asked for was essentially a committee to be set up to 
determine the practicality of doing all of this.  And the court said that the 
legislature could not do that because of our home-rule articles in our Constitution.  
And that could only happen if Boston asks for that…I still come back to the fact 
that I think that the—in terms of a critique, the biggest failure of this was not being 
able to have this—have a strong clearly organizing piece to this.  And so, all the 
eggs had to go into this one basket and which was letting—having the legislature 
make this decision.” (Interview with Zebulon Miletsky and Tomás González, 
2016) 
As the Boston Globe reported, “In a complaint filed with the court, the 
committee's lawyers contend that Robert MacQueen, clerk of the House of 
Representatives, wrongly interpreted an amendment to the state Constitution that 
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the incorporation committee said should allow the Mandela question to be put 
before the Legislature and included as a nonbinding referendum question in 
November during Boston's municipal election. According to the complaint, Rep. 
Byron Rushing (D-South End) sought to file a bill in the Legislature to put the 
Mandela question on the ballot but was told by MacQueen that as a home-rule 
petition the bill needed the support of the Boston City Council and Boston's 
mayor.”  (Winston, Boston Globe, June 17, 1987)  
As Rushing recalls it, “We actually, went to the SJC about this because—
and the SJC said, “No, you can’t vote to have a discussion about this.  This is yes 
or no.  You need to have to set up the town or city or not…” (Interview with 
Zebulon Miletsky and Tomás González, 2016) 
The Globe article continued, “According to Alan J. Rom, an attorney for 
GRIP, the state Constitution provides that home-rule petitions can come before the 
Legislature without City Council approval in cases of incorporation, annexation or 
de-annexation… No further administrative remedies exist which the plaintiffs 
might exhaust in order to obtain a determination of their present rights, status and 
legal relationship, Rom said in the complaint. So GRIP has now asked the court to 
decide the question and have MacQueen turn the bill over to a legislative 
committee so that it may go through the process for inclusion on November's 
ballot.” (Winston, Boston Globe, June 17, 1987) 
Ultimately they were successful in getting the referendum back on the ballot 
in 1988.  As Rushing points out, however, the ultimate failure of the Mandela 
initiative had to do with a lack of solid organizing.   He explains, “If you have a 
group of 500 people who are a part of this, you know, organizing, you would then 
go and put the pressure on the City Council to do this because the City Council 
could’ve done this.  The City Council could do it right now.” (Rushing, 2016)  In 
the final analysis, the state Legislature was severely limited in what it could do, but 
it could put up these nonbinding referendums to make a statement, and perhaps 
pursue the matter from there.  The problem is that neither referendum passed. 





“Take a Stand, Own the Land”: The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative  
 In response to the Mandela movement, a local group, the Dudley Street 
Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI), proposed an alternate and more moderate plan 
that did receive support from the community and Mayor Flynn. It is our contention 
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that the City of Boston gave the nonprofit organization control of the Dudley 
Square Triangle and created its land trust in response to the Mandela movement. 
The transfer was mainly made, however, because DSNI had a grassroots 
groundswell of organizing and investments from private foundations.  Also, at least 
two years of solid organizing and community revitalization through cleanups led 
by DSNI convinced the city that this was an exceptionally viable program and 
initiative. And that’s exactly what DSNI got—control over the land, over the 
planning, over the development process.  The most significant difference in these 
two undertakings was that Mandela did not have a groundswell of Roxbury 
residents participating in the planning and in the process, or an effective organizing 
program on the ground.  
 There is much evidence to suggest that the defeat of Mandela was the 
impetus behind the city’s willingness to get rid of this land.  Indeed, there were 
many factors and parallels between the Mandela movement and DSNI because the 
former’s aspirational goal was community control. As historians have often 
pointed out with regard to the epic struggles waged during the civil rights 
movement, having both Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X was what made the 
nonviolent movement successful due to the fact that Malcolm X’s program 
represented such a drastic solution. Ossie Davis recalls in Voices of Freedom: An 
Oral History of the Civil Rights Movement from the 1950s Through the 1980s, 
by Henry Hampton and Steve Fayer, “[Malcolm] was blunt where King was 
tactful. They were both smart, both extraordinarily eloquent and articulate. He 
could say the anger, while King could do the softer encouraging, persuasion, 
pushing, prodding. Malcolm was a reinforcing person and responded to a different 
need in us. It was always hard to try to 
be half as good as Dr. King. Even though we believed in nonviolence, it was also 
very good to have somebody vent the other side. There always need to be multiple 
voices with multiple strategies pursuing social change.” (Hampton and Fayer, 
1990, 250) In this case, Mandela was Malcolm X and DSNI was Martin Luther 
King, Jr.  
 In 1987, the city agreed to create the land trust.  Prior to the creation of 
DSNI, the city laid out what it thought would be the comprehensive revitalization 
of the Dudley Square neighborhood.  Flynn’s administration had plans for Dudley 
Square, but they did not include a community-led process.  At the same time that 
Mandela was being proposed, other grassroots initiatives were also asking the city 
to participate in their process (and not the other way around, which was more 
traditional), giving credence to the very paternalistic view of city government those 
community organizers were expressing. 
 As the authors of Streets of Hope, a history of DSNI, point out, “Some 
people linked the Flynn administration’s support of DSNI’s eminent domain to city 
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opposition to the movement to have Greater Roxbury secede from Boston and 
reincorporate as a separate city named Mandela. … Some Mandela organizers 
claimed that DSNI’s eminent domain application was nothing more than a way to 
sabotage the reincorporation process and provide Flynn with a bone to throw 
Roxbury.” (Medoff and Sklar, 1994, 131)  
 Andrew Jones, interviewed in the Bay State Banner shortly before the BRA 
hearings on granting eminent domain to DSNI, remarked, "This is the twilight 
zone. It's getting bizarre.  It's a purely political move and it's tied to incorporation. 
It makes no sense at all for any city government to give that power to a private 
agency….The people in this community have to watch themselves because the city 
is trying to head off the biggest takeover of all, of 12.5 square miles of Boston, 
Mandela."  (Havis, 1988)  
One of the main aspects in which Mandela differed from DSNI was the fact 
that there was a comprehensive plan in place and collaboration among human 
service agencies that together enabled DSNI to obtain resources. The financial 
investment showed community residents they would benefit overall.  By the end of 
1992, the Riley Foundation had put $3.2 million of direct funding into DSNI. 
Today, when you walk the Dudley Street area, it looks nothing like it did in 
1986.  At that time, homes were vacant and empty lots reigned.  Today, there is 
evident development. Because of the DSNI, the collaboration, and all of the hard 
work, a stable community has emerged.   
 
“We Want Our Own Neighborhood Development Authority”  
 
 The Greater Roxbury Neighborhood Authority (GRNA) was created in 
February 1985.  It was a direct outgrowth of King’s 1983 mayoral campaign and 
an effort to make good on some of the promises of that campaign to give the Black 
community control over the disposition of city-owned land. As Medoff and Sklar 
make clear, DSNI's general approach and partnership with the city often contrasted 
starkly with the city's response to the Greater Roxbury Neighborhood Authority 
(GRNA), which was greeted with much more skepticism.  As they write, “GRNA 
was launched in January 1985 with the leadership of former mayoral candidate 
Mel King and longtime Roxbury activists in movements for Black empowerment, 
economic justice, and community development, including Turner, Ken Wade, 
Willie Jones, and Bob Terrell. The week before the first GRNA meeting was 
scheduled to take place, the BRA's Dudley Square Plan was leaked to the press. 
When the GRNA held its first press conference, on February 14—Frederick 
Douglass Day—it called for a moratorium on the disposition of city-owned land in 
Roxbury until a ‘neighborhood authority’ was established "to review, monitor and 
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exercise some degree of control over development in the area.” (Medoff and Sklar, 
1994, 92) 
As Turner recalls, the GRNA felt “the community should have a body that 
could play the same role as the BRA in terms of the disciplining, you know, the 
criteria and process for the decision making around the land.  And there, other than 
that, there were two initiatives that were launched as tools in that process of 
determination.  One was a suit, a Ten Taxpayer suit that the GRNA, which is 
Greater Roxbury Neighborhood Authority, launched with the help of a couple of 
the professors in the Law Department at UMass Boston, where we challenged the 
city on the fact that there hadn’t been a development plan in about 25 or 30 years, 
and basically took the position in court that they, you know, couldn’t, they didn’t 
have the legal right to move forward with the dispossession of the land in the 
community without a new development plan which caused, we think, a serious 
amount of concern…in this city and eventually led to them setting up a process to 
develop a new master plan to offset our suit.” (Turner, 2016) 
Not only was there a definite connection between GRNA and Mandela, it 
would be accurate to say that GRNA and Mandela worked in tandem. As Turner 
recalls:  
They actually took the concepts that we were working with and 
took them to a higher level, and so there were numbers within 
GRNA neighborhood council who felt that the presence of the 
initiative…was very helpful in terms of putting pressure on Flynn 
to be willing to negotiate with us since, you know, we were less of 
a threat to his authority and power than Mandela.  And you know 
my perspective is that’s in fact [what] led to his saying, well, I can’t 
win. When it was clear that he couldn’t put an independent group, a 
group independent of our neighborhood council, in place, he said, 
well…I’m establishing neighborhood councils in a number of areas 
and, in that context, you know, put his stamp of support on the, on 
the Roxbury Neighborhood Council as a group that they would 
work with and eventually, you know, that neighborhood council 
was written into the Article 50 in the Zoning Code and…the council 
was given to make decision to be the voice of the community in 
relationship to land development issues, not having the power, 
decision making power, but having the power to hold hearings and 
to make recommendations, be the group that had the authority 
within the Zoning Code to make recommendations to the city and to 
hold hearings on the issues of zoning appeals and zoning practices.  
And so when, you know, I think that the Mandela initiative was—
the existence of the Mandela initiative was the key leverage in 
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terms of the mayor being willing to acknowledge the neighborhood 
council and have the BRA work with us.  (Interview with Zebulon 
Miletsky and Tomás González, 2016) 
 
 On the other hand, as Sklar and Medoff suggest, “The Greater Roxbury 
Neighborhood Authority (GRNA) only decided to support the referendum as “a 
tactical matter.”  As member Ken Wade explains in an interview with the authors, 
“We were not sold on the notion that the major strategy for empowerment should 
be the creation of a separate city for, principally, people of color. We thought, as a 
tactical matter, it helped to surface the disparity in terms of service delivery. It 
helped to provide an organizing tool to get people talking, meeting, and in motion 
around something. If nothing else, our perspective in the GRNA was that you 
would have to have this study that would reveal how the city is shortchanging that 
community." (Medoff and Sklar, 1994, 132). 
The other legacy of Mandela and GRNA’s efforts was the creation of the 
Roxbury Neighborhood Council (RNC). In 1984, the Office of Neighborhood 
Services proposed five neighborhood councils in Roxbury, West Roxbury, 
Dorchester, Chinatown, and Jamaica Plain.  Flynn appointed eight people as 
interim council members to the nascent Roxbury Neighborhood Council, all of 
whom were members of GRNA.  They were charged with conducting an election 
for the purpose of staffing a fifteen-member council whose role was to advise in 
the future development and the disposal of city-owned land.   As the Banner article 
explains, the city approached the GRNA about becoming the council for the 
neighborhood of Roxbury: “The Flynn administration recognized the Roxbury 
group as the official council for the neighborhood. Like the other neighborhood 
councils, the RNC was given advisory authority, not the power that activists had 
sought to approve or kill projects.  In their heyday of the 1980s and early '90s, the 
neighborhood councils held annual elections in which residents were elected both 
at-large and from districts within their areas.” (Banner, 2015) 
As the Banner further explained, the main sticking point between the newly 
founded GRNA and the Flynn administration was the question of veto power to 
approve or reject projects within Roxbury. “The Roxbury Neighborhood Council 
was originally established in 1986, an outgrowth of the Greater Roxbury 
Neighborhood Authority, a community organization that sought community 
control over development in Roxbury.” (Banner, 2015)  The article continued, 
“The push for neighborhood councils in Boston mirrored a national trend toward 
greater community control. Neighborhood councils in cities like New York were 
given real veto power over development projects. In the 1983 city election, the 
organizing group Mass Fair Share placed a nonbinding referendum on the ballot 
calling for the establishment of neighborhood councils with veto power. The 
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measure passed by a two-to-one margin.” (Banner, 2015)  Many members of the 
Flynn administration, including his Chief of Staff Neil Sullivan, were former 
organizers with Mass Fair Share and had done much important work organizing on 
the basis of class.  
In a letter to the newly appointed members of the Roxbury Neighborhood 
Council dated June 12, 1986, Flynn wrote, “I am seeking to establish an 
unprecedented level of community involvement in development planning and 
neighborhood service delivery. At the same time, I am seeking to balance the 
process rights of each individual neighborhood with my responsibility as Mayor of 
the City as a Whole.” He added,  “As in every neighborhood, this administration 
has two fundamental responsibilities in reference to development in Roxbury:  We 
are responsible for doing all that we can to foster redevelopment that benefits the 
poor and working families and the businesses in the area; and are responsible for 
involving the community in a meaningful way in the decision-making process.”  At 
the same time, he wanted to balance the power of the councils with the mayor and 
city as a whole, and this led to many disagreements between the RNC—which 
wanted a higher degree of control—and the city.  Flynn clarified his position on the 
matter. “At no time, either as Mayor or as a mayoral candidate, have I favored 
granting veto power within the development process to any neighborhood council 
or development advisory committee fulfilling the recent BRA Board vote; it 
became clear to me that the ‘approval rights’ members of the committee were 
seeking other development uses for publicly held land that might allow one 
neighborhood to block a proposal without further recourse for the Mayor as the 
elected representative of all city residents. I find this an unacceptable level of veto 
power.” (Flynn, 1986) 
The Roxbury Neighborhood Council's role is outlined in the Zoning Code, 
BRA Article 50, as being “to promote the public safety, health and welfare of the 
people of Roxbury, within the boundaries as defined by the zoning commission of 
the City of Boston and to promote and expand neighborhood economic 
development by working with the city, state, other neighborhood agencies and 
individuals to identify, promote and create new jobs and business opportunities for 
the Roxbury neighborhood.” (BRA Zoning Code, BRA Article 50) 7 
Turner further observes: “The legacy of the Mandela movement was that the 
issue was to have the community having an authoritative voice in that process, and 
so at the end of the master planning process there was the development of a 
governing group called the ‘Roxbury Strategic Master Plan Oversight Committee’ 




that…was appointed by the Mayor and had the authority to make recommendations 
to the BRA in terms…developers of particular parcels of land…to the BRA, the 
larger parcels, particularly in the Dudley Square area.”  (Turner, 2016)  
  But again, as Streets of Hope notes, not all of the leadership of GRNA 
agreed about Mandela, as GRNA co-chair Bob Terrell explained: "It doesn't make 
sense to have a separate city that's just as underdeveloped as the neighborhood 
already is underdeveloped ... The shift in the geopolitical definition wouldn't solve 
our underlying economic problems." (Medoff and Sklar, 1994, 132).  As Kennedy 
and Tilly write, “Leaders like Mel King and State Representative Byron Rushing, 
who had supported and in some cases helped to initiate earlier proposals for a 
separate Roxbury, quickly supported GRIP. Grassroots groups such as the Greater 
Roxbury Neighborhood Authority hesitated longer, put off by GRIP's single-
minded and sometimes sectarian insistence that incorporation was the only way to 
solve Roxbury's problems. But the GRNA, as well as progressive multiracial 
groups such as the Rainbow Coalition (a spinoff of Mel King's 1983 mayoral 
campaign), eventually endorsed the Mandela referendum as one strategy for 
community control and self-determination.” (Kennedy and Tilly, 1987, 24) 
 Interestingly, Medoff and Sklar report: “The DSNI board voted not to take a 
position on the referendum. Board members could be found on both sides. The 
Mandela issue never came up in DSNI's discussions with city officials. City 
officials say they never linked Mandela and DSNI in their own deliberations about 
eminent domain.” (Medoff and Sklar, 1994, 132) Finally, BRA planner Andrea 
D’Amato, also quoted, says “Mandela was much more of an issue outside the 
[BRA] than it ever was internally…The BRA or PFD [Public Facilities 
Department] commitment, to the best of my understanding, was never a response 
to Mandela.  It was never a way of satisfying Mandela in a different way… It was 
just a weird twist of timing.” (Medoff and Sklar, 1994, 132) 
Davis offered a different opinion: “I leaned into the foundations to support 
the DSNI.  The whole white campaign, there was a whole effort on garbage 
being—there was a whole kind of phenomenon of garbage on vacant lots.  And 
you know, [it] just pushed the community to start claiming those lots and, in return, 
push[ed] the city to actually put white picket fences around the lot to make visible 
the issue.” (Interview with Zebulon Miletsky, 2015)   Davis continues, “The one 
thing that we were very—I was personally very pleased with, was DSNI—if I look 
back historically, and I say, well, what am I happy about, what made it worth it?  
DSNI made it worth it.  Because they’ve been able to influence community 
organizing all around the country, all around the world, really.” (Interview with 
Zebulon Miletsky, 2015) 
Rushing, a state representative from the nearby South End, also sees some 
correlation. Speaking of DSNI specifically, he said, “We’re influenced with that 
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geographic look, and looking at ways then to do that kind of organizing 
approaching a neighborhood that way, without risking losing the support from the 
power structure because you insist on independence.  So, rather than insisting on 
having your own mayor, you say, ‘Oh no, we want to just have control over…all 
the land the city owns at my neighborhood.’ We—you can't do anything to that 
land without coming to the neighbors, right?  …That kind of approach, I think, was 
definitely influenced with this idea.” (Interview with Jeremy Bingham, 2014)   
As Kennedy and Tilly write, “In fact, the GRNA has been active in pulling 
together a citywide Coalition for Community Control, which links together 
neighborhoods across the city in demanding greater community authority over 
development. Boston's powers-that-be tried to use the Mandela referendum to 
discredit the GRNA and other black groups and leaders that seek to pursue a 
community control strategy. We believe that instead, the debate over incorporation 
is likely to give new visibility and a political boost to that strategy.” (Kennedy and 
Tilly, 1994, 25) 
Gloria Fox, the longtime Roxbury state representative, sums up the quandary 
well: “So, there were a lot of things that would have turned out differently in the 30 
years that has gone on since we brought this innovative idea of self-governance, 
self-determination, kujichagulia, and the ability to determine your life...  That was 
brought to the people and no matter how they looked upon it, hindsight is 20/20, 
the same things that people are complaining about now they could have been, 
maybe not completely washed away, but they could have been dealt with by the 





Tilly and Kennedy make an important point in their article on Mandela that 
Roxbury was both a neighborhood and a commodity, which is a helpful framework 
for understanding the discrepancy between the differing visions of the city and 
mayor and the community. They write, “Roxbury can be analyzed in two ways, 
both of which are important to an understanding of its unique role in the current 
transformation of Boston. It is a neighborhood, meaning that it has a particular 
location, is made up of buildings and other supporting structures, and occupies a 
piece of land. It is also a community, specifically a Black and Latino community, 
which means that it has a social and political as well as a physical reality.  As a 
neighborhood, Roxbury is a commodity, or rather a collection of commodities. Its 
land and buildings are bought and sold on the market for profit. As a commodity, a 
neighborhood goes through cycles in which it is developed, decays, and is rebuilt, 
cycles that occur in the context of cycles of accumulation for the city and the 
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economy as a whole.” (Gastón, Kennedy, and Tilly, 1990, 99) This framework of 
“community” versus “commodity” tells us something about how much there was at 
stake for the city and neighborhood stakeholders. While residents fought to control 
their physical space and improve their quality of life in the form of Mandela, the 
city was more concerned with revenue and quieting the more radical political 
elements calling for a separate municipality. As “communities,” these areas were 
significant to those who lived there; however, in this moment as “commodities,” 
they were of little value and ripe for redevelopment.  
A short stroll around the areas of Roxbury today tells that story. Properties 
estimated to be worth well over a million dollars exist in what was once 
dismissively labeled “the ghetto.” Prior to this moment, however, Black residents 
and activists attempted to fight to protect their neighborhood from gentrification. 
 Groups such as Freeze Frame in Roxbury continue to carry the torch for 
community control over the land for the people of Roxbury.  Although there has 
been talk of reinvigorating the Roxbury Neighborhood Council, it remains a 
defunct organization. As part of his Imagine 2030 initiative, current Boston mayor 
Marty Walsh has expressed interest in possibly rebuilding the council.  Groups 
such as “Reclaim Roxbury” have been holding meetings about possibly reinstating 
the GRNA.  While Mandela, as an autonomous Black-majority city, did not come 
to fruition, the ideas behind it sparked a shift in discussions about community 
control. In the wake of national changes, including deindustrialization and a rising 
population of urban unemployed people, local politicians and their constituents 
were propelled to come up with solutions to new problems. If it had succeeded, 
Mandela would have served as a model for self-determination as understood by 
those influenced by the movements of the 1960s. Instead, in the failure of the 
referenda, Flynn, DSNI, and to a certain degree the residents of Roxbury were able 
to construct a new vision for the future of this community. While one can debate 
whether or not this vision benefited the residents of Roxbury, it is clear that 
“Mandela” pushed the debate about community control forward on a more 
progressive path. 
 In the final analysis, Mandela suffered most from a lack of organizing 
experience on the part of its founders, Andrew Jones and Curtis Davis. King, in an 
unpublished paper written after the first vote on Mandela, argued, "Transformation 
starts with the belief that we can fashion a community that is free of the 
oppressive, elitist dominance that currently characterizes the relationships in this 
country.... Our first step is to define the community and the direction in which it 
would proceed. Everything being suggested here are things we have already done 
... I am convinced that failure to organize at this level will mean that we are moved 
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